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Conclusions: 
The design of t he  E lec t r i ca l  Protective System Module (EPSM) w a s  approved as 
presented, and approval w a s  given t o  complete the  drawings necessa ry to  build 
an EPSM according t o  t h i s  design and t o  re lease these drawings for fabricat ior  
. ... . . .I 
B. L. Ms tad te r  requested tha t  t he  f a i l u r e  modes and e f f ec t s  analysis be 
expanded t o  show what would happen i f  t h e  re lay  c o i l s  should short .  
Fai lure  Modes 1-9, 20, 21, and 22 have been added t o  describe t h e  e f f ec t s  of 
t h i s  type f a i lu re .  
Corrective Action Recommendation Issued 
Date Memo No. 
'',*,. .*'~-'* 4925 : 66 : 108 
iii 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
This design review presents the latest conception of the Electrical 
Protective System Module (EPSM) comparing the similarities to and differences 
from the features and provisions of preceding designs, 
backup data and analyses upon which this design is based. 
fabrication and assembly drawings has been prepared and is ready to be 
submitted for drafting check and release pending approval by the Design 
Included is the 
A complete set of 
Review Board. 
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DISCUSSION 
Elec t r ica l  Generating System Emergency Shutdown Parameters 
There a r e  8 conditions i n  PCS-G which i f  any one or more occurs can 
i n i t i a t e  a programmed emergency shutdown of t he  EGS. These 8 were selected 
a f t e r  careful  consideration of past experience i n  the  various SNAP-8 system 
test loops, especial ly  as applicable to t h e  spec i f ic  requirements and operating 
conditions peculiar to PCS-G. These 8 conditions are as follows: 
1. Failure  to achieve a l te rna tor  voltage during TAA acceleration. 
2. PNL flow decay to 10% of nominal during s ta r tup  pr ior  t o  time when 
TAA reaches ra ted  speed. 
3. Condenser pressure greater  than 40 psia.  
4. PNL flow decay t o  50% of nominal any time a f t e r  s ta r tup  a f t e r  TAA 
reaches rated speed and p r io r  t o  TAA deceleration to 220 Hz on shutdown, 
5. HRL flow decay t o  10% of nominal any time a f t e r  completion of 
s ta r tup  sequence and pr ior  t o  i n i t i a t i o n  of shutdown sequence. 
6.  An extended drop i n  a l te rna tor  output voltage of 10% or more, an  
extended r i s e  i n  a l t e rna to r  output voltage of 10% or more, or combinations 
thereof, any time a f t e r  t he  a l te rna tor  voltage exceeds 108 vol t s  rms. 
7. A reactor  fast setback signal.  
8. An external  command. 
The c i r c u i t s  f o r  Condition 1 and 2 a r e  operative only during s ta r tup  and 
a r e  de-activated a f t e r  completion of the  s ta r tup  sequence. 
Condition 3 i s  operative any time there  i s  flow i n  the  heat re jec t ion  or t h e  
mercury loops and i s  de-activated at  a l l  other t i m e s .  
The c i r cu i t  f o r  
The c i r c u i t s  f o r  Conditions 4, 5 ,  and 6 a r e  operative essent ia l ly  when 
the  TAA i s  a t  ra ted speed and a re  de-activated a t  a l l  other times. 
f o r  Conditions 7 and 8 are ac t ive  any time any portion of t he  EGS i s  operating. 
The c i r c u i t s  
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Conditions 1, 2, 4, and 5 signals  a r e  provided by transducers v ia  
instrumentation s ignal  conditioning equipment. 
by a pressure actuated switch whose contacts a r e  connected in to  the  emergency 
shutdown c i r cu i t .  
a l te rna tor  voltage i t s e l f .  
reactor  subcontractor. 
space or by a test engineer on the  ground and consis ts  of a manually operated 
switch. 
condition i s  considered or known to ex i s t  whether or not a protective c i r c u i t  
f o r  t h i s  condition i s  included i n  the  system. 
Condition 3 s ignal  i s  provided 
Condition 6 s igna l  i s  t h e  ac tua l  3 phase l ine-to-neutral  
Condition 7 s ignal  is  supplied by the  nuclear 
Condition 8 s igna l  i s  i n i t i a t e d  by an astronaut i n  
This switch can be used to shut down t h e  EGS a t  any time an unsafe 
Conditions 2-6 u t i l i z e  a 2 out of 3 voting logic  to cause an emergency 
shutdown. This means t h a t  each of these conditions have 3 separate sensing 
c i r c u i t s  from which a t  l e a s t  2 outputs are required to cause an emergency 
shutdown. This logic  scheme allows one of t he  3 c i r c u i t s  to f a i l  i n  such a 
manner as to give a f a l s e  shutdown s igna l  without ac tua l ly  causing an emergency 
shutdown. 
The voltage conditions i n  the  EGS as a r e s u l t  of the  possible short- 
c i r cu i t  f a u l t s  t h a t  can occur a r e  discussed i n  Appendix A. It i s  shown t h a t  
at  l ea s t  two voltage sensors w i l l  be act ivated for any of t he  f a u l t s  considered 
and therefore  a 2 out of 3 system w i l l  start protect ive action. 
O f  t he  8 emergency shutdown conditions described i n  t h e  foregoing, only 
The EPSM as t h e  name implies provides Condition 6 i s  involved with the  EPSM. 
protection to t h e  Alternator and to a l l  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  and electromechanical 
components receiving e l e c t r i c a l  power from the  Alternator. The protection 
provided i s  against  s ing le  or multiple phase short  c i r c u i t s  or overloads, 
single or multiple phase open c i r cu i t s ,  badly unbalanced 3 phase loads and load 
power factors ,  and excessive TAA ro t a t iona l  speed. The EPSM continuously 
monitors each phase of t h e  3 phase Alternator output voltage with no in t e r -  
mediate transducers or s igna l  conditioners required. Since it must be ready 
to operate f o r  t h e  f u l l  rated l i f e  of t h e  EGS a t  any time a f t e r  t h e  Alternator 
l ine- to-neutral  voltage exceeds 108 vo l t s  rms ,  every e f fo r t  has been made to 
use t h e  most r e l i a b l e  components avai lable  and use them i n  a foolproof and 
r e l i a b l e  c i r c u i t  
5 
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EPSM Design Objectives 
The addition to the NASA specifications of the requirements that the 
EGS be capable of several restarts and shutdowns, and that the design of the 
M;S be such that repair or replacement of most EGS components could be made 
while in flight by virtue of the mission being a manned rather than unmanned 
mission, has resulted in a number of changes in the design philosophy and 
design objectives of many EGS components and in the EGS itself. 
EPSM Design Objectives for Unmanned Mission 
For the original single start unmanned mission application, the design 
objectives for the various EGS components were to make them extremely rugged 
and reliable and capable of meeting or exceeding all performance requirements 
and design life when subjected to the various extremes of the rigorous SNAP-8 
environment. 
and producing electrical power for as long as possible even though to continue 
running might result in damage or destruction of the EGS or one or more of its 
components. 
failure or degradation of some internal component, some power output would be 
On such a mission the EGS was to be started and kept running 
Wen if the EGS output power were severely reduced because of a 
better than no power output, Thus, if the various EGS components had sufficient 
operating margin, a failure or degradation of one component could in some 
cases be offset by working another component or group of components somewhat 
beyond their rated capacity. 
or components might be severely decreased, the fact t h a t  the operation of the 
EGS might be prolonged was considered to be of even greater importance. For 
this mission loss of output power because of destruction of the EGS would be 
no worse than shutting down the EGS to prevent its being further damaged. 
Even though the life of the overloaded component 
For this original application the EPSM had to sense merely that a fault 
condition existed. If the fault were to occur in the Vehicle Load, the EPSM 
would protect the EGS and keep it running. 
periodically remove the voltage applied to the Vehicle Load, by opening the 
VU, any other protection for the Vehicle Load would have to come through the 
action of each load's individual protective device. If a fault were to OCCUT 
in the EGS, the only hope for saving the EGS would be for the fault to clear 
Besides the action of the EPSM to 
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i t s e l f  spontaneously, or f o r  the  performance degradation to be small enough 
to be compensated f o r  by other EGS components. 
e f fec t  be no d i f fe ren t  from the  EGS running u n t i l  it destroyed itself or one 
of i t s  v i t a l  components. Therefore, if a f a u l t  were to occur i n  t h e  EGS, t h e  
only act ion t h e  EPSM would take would be to open the  vI;B to remove the  e f f ec t  
of t he  Vehicle Load from the  EGS. 
To shut down t he  EGS would i n  
EPSM Design Objectives f o r  Manned Mission 
The multiple s t a r t  repairable  components application of the EGS allows 
f o r  t he  poss ib i l i t y  of some components degrading or f a i l i n g  completely before 
the  design l i f e  of t he  EGS i s  reached. While each of t he  EGS components would 
s t i l l  be designed to be a s  r e l i a b l e  and as rugged as possible, the  components 
and the  EGS would a l s o  be designed so  that repa i r  or replacement could be made 
i n  f l i g h t  by an astronaut. For t h i s  application, t he  EGS would be started and 
kept running and producing e l e c t r i c a l  power f o r  as long a s  possible or u n t i l  
an e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t  should O C C U T ~  
For t h i s  application the  EPSM had to dist inguish between two f a u l t  
conditions: 
1. A f a u l t  i n  t he  Vehicle Load. 
2. A f a u l t  within the  EGS. 
For t he  first condition, the  EPSM would ac t  to protect the  EGS and keep 
The protection f o r  t h e  Vehicle Load would be as before - period- it running. 
i c a l l y  removing the  voltage applied to t he  load and by act ion of each load's 
individual protect ive device. For the  second condition, the  EPSM has an added 
function. It must recognize t h e  difference between t h i s  kind of f a u l t  and a 
f a u l t  i n  the  Vehicle Load. Then as quickly as possible a f t e r  an EGS f a u l t  i s  
recognized, t h e  EPSM must a c t  to shut down the  EGS to minimize any fur ther  
damage to t he  part or parts responsible f o r  the  f a u l t  and to protect the  othep 
EGS pa r t s  from becoming damaged because of these f a i lu re s .  
act ion has opened the  vL;B or shut down t h e  EGS, the  astronaut can then safe ly  
repa i r  or replace t h e  defective component or components as required, 
Once the  EPSM 
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The EPSM has the  primary function of protecting the  TAA from damage 
caused by: 
1. Short c i r cu i t s  anywhere i n  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  power dis t r ibut ion system. 
2. Badly unbalanced Vehicle Loads and/or load power factors .  
3. Excessively high TAA. ro ta t iona l  speeds. 
The EPSM has t h e  secondary function of minimizing possible damage t o  
other EGS components by shutting down t h e  EGS as quickly a s  possible should 
any of t he  above l i s t e d  malfunction conditions be detected within t h e  EGS. 
Since the  EPSM i s  energized whenever the  TAA i s  operating and must 
perform i t s  intended functions whenever required during the  rated l i f e  of t he  
EGS, it must be constructed t o  be as rugged and a s  r e l i ab le  as possible. 
Therefore, wherever p rac t i ca l  the  types of components, materials, and the  
design techniques which have proved successful i n  the  Speed Controller, 
Voltage Regulator, and associated other e l e c t r i c a l  components s h a l l  be used i n  
the  design and fabricat ion of t h e  EPSM. 
EPSM Design Features 
During the  materials and components selection portion of t h e  SW-8 
Speed Controller development, t he  a b i l i t y  t o  r e s i s t  damage by nuclear radia- 
t i on  and high temperature was the  basic capabi l i ty  a material  or component 
had t o  have before it could be fur ther  considered. Fortunately, res is tance 
t o  nuclear radiat ion and high temperature a re  often found together i n  materials. 
When radiat ion and temperature r e s i s t an t  materials a r e  found and used i n  a 
component, res is tance t o  the  other SW-8 environmental conditions can be 
achieved by proper packaging. 
The l i f e  and r e l i a b i l i t y  of a part can be improved if the  radiat ion dose 
and temperature rise a re  kept as far f romthe  tolerance limits as possible. 
For a l l  of t h e  materials used i n  t h e   SNAP-^ E lec t r i ca l  Components t h e  radiat ion 
threshold dose i s  two or more orders of magnitude above the  rated l i f e  dose 
(see 0~367736) 
s igni f icant ly  improved by addi t ional  l o c a l  radiat ion shielding. 
considerable improvement i n  l i f e  and r e l i a b i l i t y  can be achieved f o r  any given 
Therefore, l i f e  and r e l i a b i l i t y  of these par t s  can not be 
However, 
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par t  by l imit ing i t s  maximum hot spot temperature through careful  consider- 
a t ion  of the  amount of heat generated within t h a t  par t  compared to i t s  a b i l i t y  
to r e j e c t  t h a t  heat. 
Generally speaking, t h e  greater  t h e  surface area of a par t  t h e  be t t e r  
i t s  a b i l i t y  to dissipate  heat. This i s  t r u e  f o r  any of the  three  pr inciple  
ways by which heat may be removed f rom a par t  - radiation, convection, and 
conduction. 
a l l  heat i s  considered to be t ransferred only by conduction to an ac t ive ly  
cooled heat sink, none by radiat ion or convection. Therefore, as  much surface 
area a s  possible of each individual par t  i s  pla,ced i n  d i rec t  contact with the  
EPSM. Actually, some heat w i l l  be t ransferred by radiat ion and, f o r  ground 
t e s t ing  i n  par t icular ,  some by convection, However, by designing a par t  to 
have a safe operating temperature with heat transfer only by conduction, the  
ac tua l  operating temperature of t h e  par t  w i l l  be less than design resu l t ing  
i n  an improved r e l i a b i l i t y  and confidence fac tor .  
For the  design of a l l  SNAP-8 Elec t r i ca l  Controls including EPSM, 
The primary consideration f o r  locating each e l e c t r i c a l  par t  within t h e  
EPSM w a s  t he  amount of power dissipated by that par t  i n  r e l a t ion  to i t s  
maximum temperature ra t ing.  
diss ipat ing pa r t s  a r e  located closer to t h e  housing base p l a t e  than the  lower 
power diss ipat ing par t s .  In  some cases, ease of wiring and assembly resul ted 
i n  some deviation from t h i s  approach. 
f ac to r  of pa r t s  within the  housing and keeping the  center of gravi ty  a s  low as 
possible resul ted i n  some addi t ional  deviations, 
A l l  other things being equal, t he  higher power 
Finally, obtaining a good packing 
It should be noted at  t h i s  point t h a t  there  are no c r i t i c a l  thermal 
The maximum problems known to be present i n  the  EPSM. 
power dissipated within t h e  en t i r e  assembly i s  about 20 watts and t h e  maximum 
power dissipated within any one par t  i s  5.3 w a t t s  worst case. With a base 
p l a t e  area of about 234 square inches, t h e  heat t r ans fe r  r a t e  i s  less than 
0 .1wat t s  per square inch. 
num which eliminates possible thermal in te r face  ba r r i e r s  where the  walls of 
t he  housing join the  base plate .  Also, t h e  normal d ra f t  required on walls by 
standard casting pract ice  gives a continuously increasing w a l l  cross sect ional  
(See Appendix B) 
. 
Furthermore, t he  EPSM housing is  cast  from alumi- 
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area as  t h e  base p l a t e  i s  approached. 
tance t o  heat flow and hence the  temperature d i f f e r e n t i a l  between any given 
point on the  wall and the  base plate .  
This fac tor  a c t s  t o  reduce the  r e s i s -  
Another technique which was used t o  improve the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  
 SNAP-^ Speed Controller, and has a l so  been applied t o  the  EPSM, i s  t h a t  of 
derating. I n  the  EPSM, i n  a l l  cases except the  r e l ay  actuating coi ls ,  the  
power dissipated i n  a par t  i s  one-third or less of t he  rated power diss ipat ion 
of the  par t .  For the  r e c t i f i e r  and r e s i s t o r s  t h e  derating i s  applied t o  the  
power ra t ing  of each par t  when mounted by i t s  leads and cooled by convection 
ra ther  than t h e  power r a t ing  when mounted on an aluminum heat sink p l a t e  as 
they a re  mounted i n  t h e  EPSM. 
Theoretically, t he  r e c t i f i e r s  and r e l ay  contacts a r e  t h e  par t s  most 
prone t o  failure although no f a i lu re s  have been experienced i n  the  r e c t i f i e r s  
through a l l  t h e  Speed Controller t e s t ing  and the  relays a re  made t o  one of 
the most s t r ingent  mi l i t a ry  re lay  specifications,  M I L - R - ~ ~ o ~ ,  t o  which relays 
may be purchased. 
f i e r s  connected i n  a se r i e s  p a r a l l e l  redundant configuration ( r e c t i f i e r  quad) 
a r e  used, (See Figure 2) 
to operate i n  the  c i r c u i t  alone, Therefore, besides the  benefi t  of the  
redundant connection which allows at  l e a s t  one r e c t i f i e r  f a i l u r e  with no e f f ec t  
on operation, t he  quad configuration a l so  e f fec t ive ly  aerates  each r e c t i f i e r  
by an addi t ional  0.5 f o r  both power diss ipat ion and reverse voltage. 
In  each place where one r e c t i f i e r  i s  required four r e c t i -  
Each r e c t i f i e r  i n  a quad has suf f ic ien t  capacity 
To improve the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  r e l ay  contacts, pa ra l l e l  redundant 
connection of normally open contacts i s  used. In  addition, a 2 out of 3 r e l ay  
contact logic  network i s  employed which requires a t  l e a s t  two sensing c i r c u i t s  
t o  operate t o  produce a malfunction signal.  (See Figure 2) 
Finally,  t o  provide the  required 0.5 second time delay before a malfunc- 
t i o n  s ignal  can r e s u l t  i n  an automatic shutdown, t h e  constant volt-second 
in t eg ra l  saturat ion charac te r i s t ic  of a saturat ing reactor  i s  used as the  time 
reference. The use of t h i s  type of device r e s u l t s  i n  an extremely simple 
timing c i r c u i t  using very rugged and r e l i a b l e  par ts .  
the  design equations and tes t  r e s u l t s  of an experimental timing reactor,  
I n  Appendix C i s  shown 
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Functions of the  E lec t r i ca l  Protective System Module 
The functions t o  be performed by t h e  EPSM for t h e  multiple start 
repairable  components EGS a r e  a s  follows: 
1. Open the  Vehicle Load Breaker (VI&) (if it should be closed) pr ior  
t o  mercury inject ion.  
2. 
voltage, and once two or more of these voltages reach a predetermined minimum 
value, provide a s igna l  t o  enable the  Programmer t o  close the  VLB a t  the  
proper time during t h e  s t a r tup  sequence. 
Sense l ine- to-neutral  voltage of each phase of t h e  a l te rna tor  
3. Also, a f t e r  t he  a l te rna tor  voltages reach t h i s  minimum value, 
provide a s igna l  should two or more phases of t h e  voltage vary below 108 volts 
or above 132 vol ts .  This s ignal  s h a l l  immediately do two things. 
a .  It s h a l l  open the  VLB. 
b. It shall start a 0.5 second timer. 
With the  VU3 open, i f  t he  f a u l t  i s  on the  load s ide  of t he  VU3, the  
a l te rna tor  voltages w i l l  r e turn  t o  normal i n  something l e s s  than 0.5 seconds. 
If t h i s  occurs the  EPXM w i l l  s top t h e  timer, r e se t  it, and reclose t h e  VI&. 
If the  f a u l t  s t i l l  ex is t s ,  the  a l te rna tor  voltages w i l l  again vary outside the  
normal band, and the  EPXM w i l l  re-open t h e  VLB and r e s t a r t  t he  t i m e r .  
cycling of t h e  VU3 and t i m e r  w i l l  continue u n t i l  one of the following events 
This 
occur : 
1. The load f a u l t  corrects  itself by burning open or by t r ipping i t s  
own individual protect ive device. If the  f a u l t  corrects  i t s e l f ,  t he  a l te rna tor  
voltage w i l l  r e turn  t o  normal, t he  VLB w i l l  reclose and remain closed, and the  
0.5 second timer w i l l  be reset. 
2* The 0.5 second t i m e r  t i m e s  out sending a s ignal  t o  the  Programmer '. 
t o  start an automatic shutdown of the  EGS. 
3. 
cycling. 
and the  0.5 second timer w i l l  be rese t .  
An external  command s ignal  i s  sent t o  hold the  VLB open and s top the  
With the  VLB held open, the  a l t e rna to r  voltage w i l l  r e turn  t o  normal 
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If the  f a u l t  i s  i n  t h e  EGS, the  a l t e rna to r  voltages w i l l  not re turn  t o  
normal when t h e  VG3 i s  opened, t he  0.5 second timer w i l l  t i m e  out and start 
an automatic shutdown of t he  EGS. 
With t h e  VLB open or t he  EGS shut down, an astronaut can safe ly  proceed 
t o  locate  the  cause of t h e  f a u l t  and repair ,  replace, or disconnect it. When 
the  cause i s  corrected, t he  astronaut can then reclose the  VLB or r e s t a r t  t he  
EGS a s  applicable. 
EBSM Operation 
The EPSM consis ts  of 3 ident ica l  c i r cu i t s ,  one complete c i r c u i t  
monitoring t h e  voltage i n  each of t he  3 phases of t he  a l te rna tor  output voltage. 
(See Figure 2) 
amplifier whose output energizes two &-pole double throw relays,  a preset  dual- 
voltage sensing c i r cu i t ,  a 0.5 second timing c i r cu i t ,  and a portion of t he  
r e l ay  logic  output c i rcu i t ry .  Each c i r c u i t  monitors t h e  l ine-to-neutral  
voltage of one phase of t h e  a l te rna tor  3 phase output voltage. Two JAN high 
r e l i a b i l i t y  type 10 w a t t  s i l i con  zener diodes i n  each c i r c u i t  a r e  t h e  basic  
reference standards, one f o r  t he  under-voltage l i m i t  and t h e  second for t he  
Each c i r c u i t  consis ts  of a s ingle  phase bi-s table  magnetic 
over-voltage l i m i t .  
S t i l l  re fe r r ing  t o  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  schematic Figure 2, Phase A t o  neut ra l  
of t he  a l te rna tor  voltage i s  full-wave r e c t i f i e d  by C R l 3  through C E O  and 
f i l t e r e d  by L 1  and applied across the  control  winding c i r c u i t s  W ,  N3, and N4 
of magnetic amplifier AR1. Control winding W with zener diode VR2 controls 
t he  undervoltage t r i p  point. 
t he  overvoltage t r i p  point. 
keep the  magnetic amplifier off during s t a r tup  when t h e  a l te rna tor  voltage i s  
building up from zero. 
necessary to make the  magnetic amplifier bi-s table .  
magnetic amplifier design and control charac te r i s t ics .  ) 
with R6 provides some adjustable r a t e  feedback to slow down the  switching of 
t he  magnetic amplifier from one reference s t a t e  to i t s  a l t e rna te  reference 
s t a t e .  
being switched because of t rans ien t  dips and r i s e s  which occur normally with 
s tep  load changes. 
Control winding N 3  with zener diode VR3 controls 
Control winding N4 provides the  necessary b i a s  t o  
Control winding N5 provides the posi t ive feedback 
(See Appendix D f o r  t he  
Control winding N6 " 
This delay i s  included to prevent the  Vehicle Load Breaker ( V U )  from 
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The Phase A t o  neutral voltage of the Alternator is also applied t o  the 
gate windings NlA and NLB of magnetic amplifier AR1. 
output is full-wave rectified by CR1 through C R ~  and applied t o  the actuating 
coils of relays K l L l  and K1I2 and the positive feedback winding N5. 
CR9 through CR12 are called free wheeling rectifiers and cancel the inductive 
The magnetic amplifier 
Rectifiers 
effect of the relay coils. 
windings N2, N3, and N4 are reduced enough t o  start t o  turn the magnetic ampli- 
fier on, the magnetic amplifier output applied to N5 winding further decreases 
the net negative ampere-turns in the core which in turn increases the magnetic 
amplifier output further decreasing the net negative ampere-turns thereby 
driving the magnetic amplifier t o  full on. 
turns of W ,  N3, and N4 become negative enough t o  reduce the magnetic amplifier 
output, the reduced voltage across N5 reduces the positive ampere-turns produced 
by N5. The effect of this is to increase the net negative ampere-turns in the 
core further reducing the magnetic amplifier output. 
reduces the positive ampere-turns produced by N5. 
the magnetic amplifier is driven t o  full off. 
When the net negative ampere-turns of control 
Conversely, when the net ampere- 
This in turn further 
This action continues until 
When K l L l  and KlI2 relays are energized, K l L l E 2  and K l I 2 E 2  close, K l L l E 3  
opens, and K l U &  closes. 
itself on through contacts K2E2 and K2Ek. 
voltage/overvoltage circuit in Phase A is armed and ready t o  perform as designed. 
K l L l E b  closing energizes the reset winding of the timing reactor I2. 
opening removes power from the timing winding of L2. 
energized, ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 6  and 1 ~ 2 ~ 6  contacts close and K l L l E 7  and KlI2E7 contacts open. 
These contacts are in a 2 out of 3 logic circuit which in conjunction with the 
equivalent contacts in the Phase B and Phase C circuits control the automatic 
opening and closing of the VIB. 
K l L l E 2  and K l I 2 E 2  closing energizes K2 which locks 
When K2 is energized the under- 
K l L l E 3  
With K l L l  and KlI2 
Once K2 is energized, any Phase A t o  neutral voltage excursions below 
108 volts rms or above 132 volts r m s  will cause K l L l  and K1L2 relays to become 
de-energized. This will cause K l L l E 2  and K l I 2 E 2  to open. However, since K2 
is energized and K2E2 and K2E4 are closed, this will have no effect. 
K l L l E 3  will close and K l L l E 4  will open, 
winding of L2. 
However, 
K l L l E 3  closing will energize the timing 
K l U &  opening will de-energize the reset winding of I2. 
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If K l L l  and K1L2 relays a r e  not re-energized before I2 timing reactor  
saturates,  K3  w i l l  energize opening K3El and K3E3 contacts i n  the  2 out of 3 
logic network i n  t h e  automatic shutdown c i r cu i t .  The timing reactor  I2 w i l l  
saturate i n  0.5 seconds. An equivalent act ion i n  e i the r  t h e  Phase B c i r c u i t  
or t he  Phase C c i r c u i t  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  required t o  start an automatic shutdown 
of the EGS. 
included t o  allow t i m e  f o r  t he  a l te rna tor  voltage t o  recover t o  within the  
design range a f t e r  t h e  VIB i s  opened. This t i m e  was selected on t h e  bas i s  of 
t rans ien t  tes t  data obtained when adding and removing 35 kw s tep  vehicle loads 
on the  TAA during PCS-1 tes t ing .  
The 0.5 second delay provided by t h e  timing reactor  I2 is  
Overspeed Protection Circuit  Limitations 
The previous overspeed c i r cu i t  (Figure 3) used i n  PCS-1 sensed the  
frequency of the  a l t e rna to r  voltage with a se r i e s  resonant L/C c i r cu i t .  
resonant increase i n  current flowing through a trimming potentiometer i n  se r i e s  
with the  resonant c i r cu i t  produced a voltage across t h e  potentiometer a portion 
of which w a s  applied t o  the  gate of an SCR. The value of t h i s  voltage could be 
adjusted t o  t h a t  required t o  t r i gge r  t h e  SCR. 
a re lay  whose contact ' s  operation produced the  overspeed shutdown signal. 
The 
The f i r i n g  of t he  SCR energized 
There were several  disadvantages t o  t h i s  c i r cu i t  especially i f  applied 
t o  a f l i g h t  ra ted  system. In 
the SNAP-8 nuclear t e s t i n g  program, 0~367736, performed a t  t h e  Georgia Nuclear 
Laboratories of Lockheed-Georgia Company, the  test data showed t h a t  t he  type 
2~1778 SCR's which were evaluated had a fast neutron damage threshold a t  about 
5 x 1011 nvt. 
times lower than the  next most sensi t ive component, t h e  s i l i con  r e c t i f i e r .  The 
r e c t i f i e r  threshold occurred a t  about 1 x 1013 nvt. 
spread among t h e  SCR's with one shorting before the  end of t h e  tes t ing .  
disadvantage of SCR's i s  t h a t  they a re  extremely sens i t ive  and can be t r iggered 
"on" by s t r ay  e l e c t r i c a l  noise even when precautions a r e  taken t o  prevent t h i s  
occurrence. The E lec t r i ca l  Components Section has experienced several instances 
of f a l s e  t r iggering of SCR's by e l e c t r i c a l  noise i n  PCS-1 and i n  t h e  laboratory 
even with noise protection techniques employed. 
The primary disadvantage w a s  t he  use of an SCR. 
This i s  about 5 t i m e s  higher than t h e  specified dose and 0.05 
There w a s  considerable 
Another 
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Another disadvantage of t h i s  c i r c u i t  i s  t h a t  it i s  dependent upon the  
If t h e  a l te rna tor  voltage were to be lost f o r  whatever a l te rna tor  voltage. 
reason, the  frequency information would a l so  be lost. This could be a serious 
problem especial ly  during EGS startup. 
There has been included i n  the  present design of t he  TAA a small 
permanent-magnet tachometer pickup. Unfortunately, t h e  output of t h i s  pickup 
i s  very narrow posi t ive and negative pulses having very l i t t l e  power and being 
very r i c h  i n  harmonics. 
s ignal  conditioner would be required. 
t ioner  having the  same high r e l i a b i l i t y  as t h e  other e l e c t r i c a l  components. 
This i s  not avai lable  and would have to be developed. 
(See Figure 4) To use t h i s  s ignal  some form of 
This then would require a s igna l  condi- 
Elimination of a Separate Overspeed Protection Circuit  
A separate overspeed protection c i r c u i t  a s  described i n  paragraph 2. of 
Appendix E was eliminated f romthe  EPSM f o r  the  following reasons: 
1. The output s igna l  from the  tachometer pickup i n  t h e  TAA i s  inadequate 
to drive the  standard frequency sens i t ive  c i r c u i t s  which have already been 
developed f o r  the  SNAP-8 e l e c t r i c a l  controls without some form of s ignal  condi- 
t ioning . 
2. The undervoltage/overvoltage sensing c i r c u i t  can provide overspeed 
sensing because of t h e  constant vo l t s  per cycle controll ing charac te r i s t ics  of 
t h e   SNAP-^ voltage regulator.  
3. Because of t he  capabi l i ty  described i n  2. above, t h e  only need f o r  
a separate overspeed c i r c u i t  i s  during s t a r tup  to protect the  TAA from over- 
speeding i f  f o r  some reason the  a l t e rna to r  should not produce an output voltage. 
Without an output voltage, no e l e c t r i c a l  load can be placed upon t h e  al ternator .  
4. 
TAA t h a t  even under the  reduced power capabi l i ty  of t he  EGS during s ta r tup  if 
the  EGS were to be shutdown t h e  instant  an overspeed s ignal  w a s  received, there  
would s t i l l  be suf f ic ien t  energy i n  the  hot gas to continue to increase t h e  TAA 
speed to runaway speed where the  TAA could be damaged. Therefore, t h i s  c i r c u i t  
could not r e a l l y  protect t he  TAA because it w a s  impossible f o r  it to ac t  fast 
enough, (See Appendix F) 
It was computed from energy balance conditions of t he  bo i l e r  and the  
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EPSN Overspeed Protection Provided 
Since the   SNAP-^ Voltage Regulator i s  required to regulate t he  Alternator 
voltage a t  a constant vo l t s  per cycle r a t io ,  any change i n  TAA speed brings 
with it a proportional change i n  a l te rna tor  voltage. 
speed greater  than 10% above rated w i l l  be accompanied by a proportional 
increase i n  voltage. If t h e  Alternator voltage exceeds 132 volts rms f o r  any 
reason, t he  overvoltage c i r c u i t  of the  EPSM w i l l  start the protective act ion 
provided by t h i s  system. A s  long as overspeed protective act ion occurring at a 
speed equivalent to 132 vo l t s  i s  compatible with system requirements, and a s  
long as the  same protective act ion i s  compatible with e i ther  condition, t he  
EPSM i s  capable of providing overspeed as well a s  overvoltage protection. 
Therefore, an increase i n  
The question na tura l ly  a r i s e s  : if being dependent upon Alternator 
voltage was a disadvantage of t he  PCS-1 overspeed c i r cu i t ,  why i s  it not a 
disadvantage for t h i s  PCS-G c i r cu i t .  
s t i l l  i s  a disadvantage. 
Alternator, nei ther  c i r c u i t  can provide any overspeed protective action. To 
cover t h i s  possible malfunction condition i s  precisely why t h e  Condition 1 
emergency shutdown parameter w a s  included i n  t h e  l is t  of shutdown parameters. 
The Condition 1 c i r c u i t  monitors t he  TAA tachometer pickup outrput and the  
Alternator voltage during startup. If no Alternator voltage i s  developed a f t e r  
the  pump motors a r e  switched from inverter  power to a l te rna tor  power a t  220 Hz, 
t h i s  c i r cu i t  w i l l  a c t  to shutdown the  EGS. This c i r c u i t  can s t a r t  t h e  neces- 
sary protective act ion to prevent TAA. overspeed much e a r l i e r  i n  the  s ta r tup  
sequence than any of t h e  other overspeed protection c i r c u i t s  previously 
described. 
before they can start any protective action. 
pates t h a t  an overspeed condition w i l l  occur if t he  a l te rna tor  does not produce 
an output voltage to permit e l e c t r i c a l  loading of t he  T U o  Consequently, it 
can start shutting down t he  EGS su f f i c i en t ly  ear ly  t h a t  t he  likelihood of the  
TAA. reaching runaway speed i s  grea t ly  reduced. If the  TAA s ta r tup  i s  normal, 
the  Condition 1 c i r c u i t  i s  de-activated as soon as rated speed and voltage a r e  
achieved 
The answer i s  t h a t  f o r  s ta r tup  it 
If during s t a r tup  no voltage i s  developed by the  
These other c i r c u i t s  require  an ac tua l  overspeed condition to ex i s t  
The Condition 1 c i r c u i t  an t i c i -  
A t  t h i s  point t h e  undervoltage/overvoltage c i r cu i t  of Condition 6 
takes over. Since t h e  Condition 1 c i r c u i t  i s  ac t ive  only during s tar tup,  t he  
r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements on it a r e  l e s s  severe. For t h i s  and other reasons, 
the  components of t h i s  c i r c u i t  a r e  included i n  the  Prograrmner ra ther  than i n  
the  EPSM. 
Once t h e  TAA reaches rated speed and voltage and ac t iva tes  t h e  under- 
voltage/overvoltage c i r cu i t ,  a l o s s  of Alternator voltage w i l l  again r e s u l t  i n  
the  TAA overspeeding. However, i n  t h i s  case, t h e  protective act ion w i l l  be the  
r e s u l t  of an undervoltage condition ra ther  than an overspeed. 
where an overspeed condition i s  caused by l o s s  of load, the  resu l tan t  voltage 
r i s e  w i l l  cause the  overvoltage c i r cu i t  to ac t  to provide the  protective 
action. Theref ore, t he  dependency of t he  undervoltage/overvoltage c i r cu i t  
upon Alternator voltage f o r  overspeed protection i s  no longer s ignif icant .  
For the  case 
A s  w a s  described i n  t h e  "EPSM Operation" paragraphs of t h i s  report ,  there  
a re  two time delays associated with the  protective act ion of the  EPSM, one a 
variable delay i n  magamp act ion and the  other a f ixed delay produced by t h e  
0.5 second timing c i r cu i t .  
act ion of t h e  EPSM i s  s t a r t ed  by undervoltage, overvoltage, or overspeed. 
While it would be desirable  as a matter of design philosophy to eliminate these 
delays f o r  an overspeed condition, pract ical ly ,  t h i s  delay i s  of l i t t l e  s ign i f -  
icance since no act ion started by an overspeed condition can shut down the  EGX 
fast enough to prevent t h e  T U  reaching runaway speed. Figure 5 shows a curve 
of TAA speed versus time plot ted from t e s t  data taken during an emergency shut- 
down of PCS-1. This curve shows the  TAA reaching runaway speed i n  0.5 to 1.0 
seconds while the  bo i l e r  continues to del iver  suf f ic ien t  hot gas t o  maintain 
runaway speed f o r  5 or 6 seconds. 
gained and possibly much to be lost i f  t h e  EPSM were to be fur ther  complicated 
t o  require it to make t h i s  addi t ional  d i s t inc t ion .  
These two delays w i l l  occur whether protective 
Therefore, there  would be l i t t l e  to be 
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TAA 5/4 Tach Pickup Output Signal 
3/22/68 a t  1400 H r s  - PCS-1 T e s t ‘  
Scope Se t t ings :  
V e r t .  Sens. = 2 volts/cm 
Sweep = 1 millisecond/cm 
Results  : 
Output = 3 crn x 2 v/cm = 6 v o l t s  
6o = 12,000 RPM min X 
4 c y c l e  1 rev 1 c m  
2 c y c l e s  10-3sec Speed a 10 c m  
Figure 4 
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APPENDIX A 
VOLTAGES I N  THE  SNAP-^ ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
A S  THE RESULT OF POSSIBLE SHORT CIRCUIT FAULTS 
A- 1 
VOLTAGES IN THE SNAP-8 EUCTRICAL SYSTEM AS TKE RESULT 
OF PQSSIBU SHORT CIRCUIT FAULTS 
Short circuit faults on the  SNAP-^ electrical system will consist of 
the following conditions: 
1. Three-phase short circuit 
2. Phase-to-Phase short circuit 
3. Phase-to-Phase-to-Neutral short circuit 
4. Single-Phase-to-Neutral short circuit 
The voltages existing in the system as a result of these faults are as 
fo l lows  : 
1. Three - Pha s e Short Circuit 
For this case all phase-to-phase and phase-to-neutral voltages 
are zero. 
It is evident that three phase-to-neutral undervoltage sensors 
will trip on a three-phase short circuit. 
2. F'hase-t o-Phase Short Circuit 
For this case the faulted phase-to-phase voltage is zero. 
Assume phase 1 to 2 is shorted, then 
E12 = 0 
By the method of symmetrical phase components it can be shown thae 
- = 1/2 E3N . (Reference 1) EIN - E2N 
The results of a short circuit test on the s ~ p - 8  alternator are 
shown in Figure 1. For this test the alternator was separately excited. 
A-2 
- 2 -  
Another test on the alternator with its Voltage Regulator-Exciter 
supplying the field current demonstrated that the phase current on a phase-to- 
phase short circuit is 670 amperes. 
Figure 1 the voltage E 
(Reference Aerojet Report 3658.) From 
is shown t o  be 126 volts. Since as previously stated 3N 
E I N  = E2N = 1/2 E3~9 Elm = E2N = 12612 = 63 volts. 
This shows that two of three phase-to-neutral undervoltage sensors 
set to trip at 108 volts will trip on a phase-to-phase short circuit. 
39 Pha s e-t o -Phase -t o -Neutral Short Circuit 
In this case all of the faulted phase-to-phase-to-neutral voltages 
are zero. 
E12 - Em = E2N = 0 
Therefore, at least two of the three phase-to-neutral undervoltage 
sensors will trip on a phase-to-phase-to-neutral short circuit. 
4. Single-Phase-to-Neutral Short Circuit 
In this case the faulted phase-to-neutral voltage is zero. 
Assume phase 1 to neutral is shorted. 
EIN = 0 
For this condition the voltages, E2pJ and E have been determined 
These results are summarized in Figure 2 
3N 
fromtests on the s ~ ~ p - 8  alternator. 
and Figure 3. 
The conclusion is that voltages E and E are less than 102 volts and 2N 3N 
104 volts respectively, and that theref ore all three phase-to-neutral under- 
voltage sensors set at 108 volts will trip on a single-phase-to-neutral fault 
References: 
1. Symmetrical Components, Wagner and Evans, Chapter 111, page 47-48, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inca 
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AER0EET-GFXFRA.L CORPORATION 3 December 1969 
4968 : 69 : 0082-FNC : if 
160/x4207 
TO: S. L. Bradley 
FROM: F. N. Collarnore 
SUBJECT : Protective System - Single Line t o  Neutral Fault 
DISTRIBUTION: N. E. Waldschmidt 
mcLosuRE: (1) Figure - Single Line t o  Ground Fault 
A review of the  SXAP-8 a l te rna tor  and voltage regulator-exciter performance 
indicates  t h a t  a s ingle  phase l i n e  t o  neut ra l  f a u l t  w i l l  cause the  protective 
system t o  t r i p ,  
With a s ingle  phase t o  neut ra l  f a u l t  a l l  th ree  phase voltages w i l l  be below 
The under voltage t r i p  point is  se t  at  108 vol t s  l i n e  t o  neutral .  
108 vol ts .  
Enclosure (1) shows the  a l te rna tor  current and voltage vs f i e l d  current 
with a s ingle  phase l i n e  t o  neut ra l  short  c i r cu i t .  
c i rcui ted.  Short c i r c u i t  t e s t s  of t he  a l t e rna to r  with i t s  voltage regulator- 
exci ter  indicate  a maximum s ingle  phase t o  neutral  current of 940 amperes. 
(Reference Aerojet Report 3658) 
under t h i s  condition are 102 vol t s  and 104 vol t s  respectively.  
noted tha t  data shown i n  Enclosure (1) is taken without t he  voltage regulator- 
exci ter  and tha,t phases 2 and 3 a r e  open circui ted.  
exc i te r  connected, phases 2 and 3 would be loaded by t h e  saturable current 
po ten t ia l  transformer which supplies t h e  a l te rna tor  f i e l d  excitation. 
reduce the  voltages below t h a t  shown on Enclosure (1). 
Phases 2 and 3 a r e  open 
From Enclosure (1) the  voltages on phases 2 and 3 
It should be 
With t h e  voltage regulator- 
This would 
During normal operation of t he  SXAP-8 system t h e  a l te rna tor  i s  loaded by 
the  system pumps, speed control  system and vehicle load. If a l i n e  t o  neut ra l  
f a u l t  were t o  occur on one phase the  load would remain on the  other two phases 
causing a lower voltage than t h a t  shown on Enclosure (1). 
F. N. Collamore 
E lec t r i ca l  Components Section 
Power Systems Department 
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TITLES Steady-State Thermal Analysis of SNAP-8 Elec t r i ca l  
Protective System Assembly 
ABSTRACT 
The "CINDA" computer program w a s  used t o  thermally 
analyze the SNAP-8 Elec t r ica l  Protective System Assembly. 
r e su l t s  of t h i s  an lys i s  indicate t h a t  the assembly w i l l  operate 
within temperature l i m i t s  a t  the worst case rad ia tor  conditions. 
The 
ICFY WORDS: E lec t r i ca l  Protective System, thermal. analysis,  
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NOTE: The information i n  t h i s  document i s  subject t o  revision as analysis 
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I SYMBOLS AND IVOJYE~TCLATUF~E 
2 A 
C 
Area perpendicular to heat flow, ft 
Specific heat at constant pressure, BTU/lb-'F 
Configuration shape factor, dimensionless 
Emissiviky factor, dimensionless 
P 
FA 
Fe 
G Thermal conductance, BTU/hr-'F 
h 
K Thermal conductivity, BTU/hr-ft- F 
2 0  Film conductance through a bolted connection, BTU/hr-ft - F 
0 
Q Heat dissipated, watts 
U 2 0  Overall thermal conductance, BTU/h.r-ft - F 
w Weight, lb 
X Heat flow path, ft 
Q 
2 oR4 Stefan Boltzmann constant, BTU/hr-ft - 
Summation from 1 to n 
Nt 
f i r ,  
Subscripts: 
r refers to radiative 
i refers t o  node or element "i" 
ij refers to nodes "i" and " j"  
Symbols : 
IVon radiative conductance between nodes "if' and "j" 
Radiative conductance between nodes "i" and "j 
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I1 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ghe stegly-state cgmputer solution for assumed radiator temperatures 
of 225 F, 390 F, and 550 F, respectively, is presented in Table 1. The 
results show that the on@ elec8ronic component that reached its critical 
temperature limit of 125 C (257 F) was the electronig relay - Element 
Number 37 of the thermal ne8work - which reached 258 F for the most severe 
radiator temperature of 550 F. 
Because of the conservatism of the steady-state analysis no changes 
to the present design of the SNAP-8 Electrical Protective System Assembly 
are recommended. 
Element 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Table 1 - Element Temperature in Degrees Fahrenheit 
VS. Assumed Radiator Temperature 
Element 
De script ion 
Lumped element consisting of 
inner housing aluminum wall, 
magnetic amplifier AR 
transformer T induc&irs L 1' and L2, zener diode VR,, an& 
resiseors R1, R2, R3, I$+, R5, 
and R 6' 
Lumped element consisting of 
inner housing wall, magnetic 
amplifier AR transformer T 
inductor L ,3iener diode VR 
and resistzrs R8 and R ~ ~ *  
Lumped element consisting of 
rectifier heat sink, diodes CR 
to CR20 and zener diodes VR a% 2 
3, 
7' 
VR3* 
Lumped element 
rectifier heat 
CR to CR12. 1 
Lumped element 
rectifier heat 
32 * CR21 to CR 
consisting of 
sink and diodes 
consisting of 
sink and diodes 
Radiator Temperature 
22T°F 39OOF 550°F 
158 168 184 
160 170 187 
265 276 292 
165 175 192 
165 1-75 192 
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Table 1 - continued 
Element Element 
Nunib e r  D e  s c r ip t  ion 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Lumped element consis t ing of 
r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink, diodes 
to CR40 and zener diodes 
6' 
CR33 V  and VR 
5 
Lumped element consis t ing of 
r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink and diodes 
52 ' 
CR41 t o  CR 
Lumped element consis t ing of  
r e c t i f i e r  heat sink, diodes 
CR 53 VR8 and VR 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
t o  CR60 and zener diodes 
9' 
Lumped element consis t ing of 
inner housing aluminum wall, 
magnetic amplifier AR trans- 
mi t t e r  T2, and zener glade VR 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
4' 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Roadiator Tepe ra tu re  
225 F 390 5500f 
276 
177 
278 
163 
165 
163 
167 
168 
167 
160 
160 
166 
178 
158 
160 
292 
194 
294 
179 
181 
179 
187 
189 
188 
174 
175 
184 
210 
172 
176 
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Table 1 - continued 
Element 
Number 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
.30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Element 
Description 
Housing wall f o r  relays - 
aluminum 
Outer housing wall adjacent 
to doral glass element - 
aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - left 
side - aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - middle - 
aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - right 
side - aluminum 
Housing cover plate - left 
side - aluminum 
Housing cover plate - middle 
aluminum 
Housing cover plate - right 
side - aluminum 
Dora1 glass element 
3.6 watts resistor (R ) attached 
to Element 27, Comparxment A 
3.6 watts resistor (R14) attached 
to Element 2, Compartment A 
Rgdiator Tegperature 
225 F 390 F 550°F 
153 
150 
150 
154 
15 7 
147 
146 
146 
177 
174 
168 
215 
197 
210 
170 197 
160 174 
160 175 
166 184 
178 210 
152 160 
150 158 
154 166 
267 396 
256 375 
228 317 
372 533 
202 210 
220 237 
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Table 1 - continued 
Element Element 
Number De sc r ip t  ion 
Rgdiator Tegperature 
225 F 390 F 550°F 
36 3.6 watts r e s i s to r  (R ) attached 
t o  Element 27, CompargAent C 197 202 210 
37 Typical re lay  element attached t o  
Element 21, Compartment G 221 236 258 
I11 THEORY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The analysis of thermal systems such as  the one being considered 
(Figures 1 and 2)  i s  so complex tha t  the only successful approach t o  them 
i s  by the use of analogies between heat and e l e c t r i c  flow. It was then 
necessary t o  make an e l e c t r i c  network analogous t o  the thermal system 
being considered and t o  calculate  thermal conductances between adjacent 
nodes or thermal elements, 
I n  using e l e c t r i c a l  analogies temperature can be thought of as  a 
potent ia l  t ha t  causes heat t o  flow. I n  steaay-state processes the current 
of heat i s  governed by the poten t ia l  difference and the resistance of the 
heat flow path. This concept indicates  tha t  f o r  steady-state processes 
heat flow i s  analogous t o  e l e c t r i c  c y r e n t  flow, temperature i s  analogous 
t o  voltage, and thermal resistance (- ) t o  e l e c t r i c a l  resistance. (For 
t ransient  or periodic changes the ef%t of storage or capacity must be 
included, therefore, the thermal capacitance (w c ) i s  analogous t o  the 
exec tr i c a l  capacitance . ) P 
The simultaneous l i nea r  equations generated by making an energy 
balance on each node of the e l e c t r i c  network are solved by the "CINDA" 
computer program of Reference (1) by using i t e r a t i v e  f i n i t e  differencing 
techniques very similar t o  Southwell's and Etmons' relaxation method, The 
essence of the method i s  t o  make a heat balance and a rb i t r a r i l y  select  
temperatures a t  each node so tha t  the ne t  heat transferred in to  each ele- 
ment i s  approximately zero. This of course cannot be done independently 
of the adjacent nodes on a l l  sides of the one being considered, The pro- 
cedure i s  t o  s e t  up a pa t te rn  f o r  the en t i r e  system and then t o  sa t i s fy  
the requirements of zero unbalance or  pre-established residual  heat c r i -  
t e r i a  fo r  each node. 
Non radiat ive conductances for the "CINDA" program were calculated 
by the formulae: 
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= U. Ai Gi j 1 
where, 
Ki Ai 
ij 
- - -- 
X Gi j 
Radiative conductances were calculated by using the formula: 
Gr = 0 Fa Fe A 
Conductances through bolted connections were conservatively calculated 
by assuming that the contact flange area was equivalent to an area having a 
diameter four times the actual diameter of the bolt and using a parallel flow 
path, in which the total internal conductance is taken as, 
and 
1 
1 UA = 2.r 6);+ G
: . I  
2 0  A value of 144 BTU/hr-ft - F was used for the film conductance through 
the air gap based upon past experience with similar systems and to simplify 
calculations. 
Heat dissipated by electronic components were taken as given by Mr.  
Norman E. Waldschmidt of the Electronics Group, Section 4936, and were 
lwnped accordingly, i.e., either in the critical component per se or in 
the corresponding wall, as applicable. 
The heat dissipated in watts into each electronic component or wall is 
given below, in which "Q I '  refers to the heat dissipated - into . or & - 
the thermal element "i". i 
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Heat dissipated by electronic components: 
q1 
92 
q3 
94 
q5 
97 
q6 
q8 
910 
q15 
6.08 watts 
8.38 watt s 
3.20 watts 
1.0 watts 
1.0 watts 
3.20 watts 
1.0 watts 
3,2O watts 
3.03 watts 
.015 watts 
‘16 
‘17 
q21 
q23 
424 
425 
q34 
935 
q36 
937 
.015 watts 
.Ol5 watts 
28.0 watts 
. Ql5 watts 
.015 watts 
. O l 5  watts 
3.60 watts 
3.60 watts 
3.60 watt s 
3.50 watts 
All of the above heat dissipated values were multiplied by a 3.413 
factor in the “CINDA” program to convert them to BTU/hr. 
As mentioned previously it was not considered necessary to model all 
electronic components since it was obvious that some of them were not 
critical, i.e., the inductors which had a very large mass dissipated only 
.03O watts, each. Rather than modeling each inductor as a separate element 
and calculating conductances to this element it was assumed that the heat 
dissipated by the inductor will be divided equally among the two walls at 
which the inductor was attached, each receiving .015 watts. 
Critical elements such as resistors R R and R which dissipated 
3.6 watts steady-state each, were given a n%e .&ber so2Ehat a correct 
temperature could be calculated by the computer program of Reference (1) 
for each oneo 
since it dissipated 3.5 watts steady-state.) 
(This was also done for a typical relxy attached to Element 21 
IV METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The analogy between heat and electric flow was used in the preliminary 
steady-state thermal analysis of the SNAP-8 Electrical Protective System 
Assembly. The thermal configuration shown in Figures 1 and 2 was subdivided 
into seven compartments, namely, A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. 
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The electrical components in each individual compartment are as follows: 
A. Components in Compartment, "A" 
1. Components attached to Elements #1, #3, and #4 
a) Rectifier Heat Sink including diodes CR1 to CR20 
and zener diodes VR2 and VR 3 
b) Zener Diode VR1 
c) Inductor L 1 
d) Magnetic Amplifier AR1 
1 e) Transformer T 
f) Resistors R to R6 1 
2, Components attached to Element #27 
7 a) Resistor R 
€3. components in Compartment "B" 
1. Components attached to Elements #1, #5, and #6 
a) Rectifier Heat Sink including diodes CR21 to 
CRbO and zener diodes VR 6 and VR 5 
3 b) Inductor L 
Components attached to Element #2 2. 
8 to R14 a) Resistors R 
Components attached to Element #10 3. 
a) Magnetic Amplifier AR2 
b) Transformer T 
c) Zener Diode VR4 
2 
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C. Components in Compartment "C" 
1. Components attached to Elements #2, #7, and #8 
60 a) Rectifier Heat Sink including diodes CR to CR 41 
9 and zener diodes VR and VR 8 
7 b) Zener Diode VR 
c) Inductor L 
d) Magnetic Amplifier AR 
e) Transformer T, 
5 
3 
J 
15 to R20 fj Resistors R 
2. Components attached to Element #27 
a) Resistor R21 
D. Components in Compartment I'D" 
1. Reactor Inductor L2 
E. Components in Compartment "E" 
4 1. Reactor Inductor L 
F. Components in Compartment "F" 
6 1. Reactor Inductor L 
G. Components in Compartment "G" 
3 
6 
9 
1. Relzys 5L1, K1L2, K2, and K 
2. Relays K4L1, K4L2, K and K 
3* Relays yLl, Kp2, K8, and K 
5' 
The thermal configuration was subsequently subdivided into 39 thermal 
nodes or elements described at the end of this section. 
computer time to a minimum it was necessary to lump certain non-critical 
In order to keep 
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elements i n to  an equivalent thermal element whose temperature w i l l  be repre- 
sentative of the average temperature of each of the individual elements 
lumped, I n  doing th i s ,  i t  was kept i n  mind tha t  the r e s u l t s  of the analysis 
w i l l  indicate whether o r  not a f i n e r  element subdivision or a more refined 
thermal analysis should be made. 
An e l e c t r i c a l  network analogous t o  the thermal system (Figures 2 and 3) 
was then made and thermal conductances between adjacent nodes were calculated. 
The temperatures a t  each individual node were calculated by using the computer 
program of Reference (1) and the thermal properties given i n  Table 2. 
Table 2 - Steady-State Thermal Properties 
Material 
Thermal Cpx$ctivity 
BTU/hr-ft - F / f t  
A 356-T6 Aluminum 92 
6061-T6 Aluminum 92 
Beryllium Oxide 64 
Steel  33 
Stea t i te  1.5 
Copper 226 
Dora1 Glass 0 , 1815 
Note: Thermal conductivit ies were obtained from References 
(21, (31, (41, and (5). 
Thermal Element Description: 
1, Lumped element consisting of inner housing aluminum wall, 
3’ magnetic amplifier ARlY transformer T inductors L and L zener diode VR1, and r e s i s to r s  R 1 t o  1 
2. Lumped element consisting of inner housing wall, magnetic 
amplifier AR , transformer T inductor L zener diode VR 7’ and res i s tor2  R8 t o  R20* 3’ 5’ 
13 3. Lumped element consisting of r e c t i f i e r  heat sink, diodes CR 
3’ t o  CR20 and zener diodes VR2 and VR 
10 
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Lumped element 
to CR12. 
Lumped element 
CR 
Lumped element 
CRhO and zener 
Lwnped element 
t o  CR 
Lumped element 
CR60 and zener 
Housing wal l  - 
32' 
52' 
Lumped element 
consisting of r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink and diodes CR1 
consisting of r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink and diodes CR21 
consisting of r e c t i f i e r  heat sink, diodes CR to 
diodes VR and VR6. 33 
5 
consis t ing of r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink and diodes CR41 
consisting of r e c t i f i e r  heat  sink, diodes CR t o  
diodes VR 
aluminum 
53 
9' 
consisting of inner housing aluminum wall, 
4' magnetic amplifier AR2, t ransmit ter  T2, and, zener diode ?R 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wall  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wall  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
Housing wal l  f o r  reltiys - aluminum 
Outer housing wal l  adjacent 'Lo doral  g lass  element - aluminum 
Housing wal l  - aluminum 
3-14 
11 
24 . 
25 
26. 
27 
2%. 
29. 
30. 
31 0 
32 0 
33 . 
34 
35 0 
36 . 
37 
38 . 
39. 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing wall - aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - left side - aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - middle - aluminum 
Housing bottom plate - right side - aluminum 
Housing cover plate - left side - aluminum 
Housing cover plate - middle - aluminum 
Housing cover plate - right side - alminwn 
Dora1 glass element 
3.6 watts resistor (R ) attached to Element.27, Compartment A 
3.6 watts resistor (R ) attached to Element 2, Compartment B 
3.6 watts resistor (R21) attached to Element 27, Compartment C 
Typical relay element attached to Element 21, Compartment G 
Heat sink boundary plate @ 140°F 
Constant radiator heat source temperature 
7 
14 
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v CALCULATED CONDUCTANCES 
The calculated conductances for  the steady-state computer run were as 
follows: 
Non-Radiative Conductances 
G1 = 1.528 BW/hr-OF 
G2 = 
G3 = 
G4 = 
G5 = 
G 6 =  
G7 = 
G 8 =  
G9 = 
G10 = 
G11 = 
G12 = 
~ 1 3  = 
G14 = 
~ 1 5  =
~ 1 6  = 
~ 1 7  =
~ 1 8  =
~ 1 9  = 
1. 945 
1.910 
,le 910 
1.945 
o . 1089 
0 0273 
0.1531 
3,520 
3.080 
1.528 
3.52 
3-08 
0.0328 
0.0857 
0.910 
0 . 945 
1.527 
1. 527 
1 1  
I 1  
I 1  
1 1  
I 1  
I1  
I t  
1 1  
1 1  
1 1  
11 
1 1  
1 1  
11 
11 
1 1  
1 1  
1 1  
G20 = 0.0905 
G21 = 0.1089 
G22 = 3.520 
G23 = 0.1531 
G24 = 0.0328 
G25 = 3.52 
~ 2 6  = 0,1531 
G27 = 0.0273 
~ 2 8  = 0.1089 
G29 = 0.1531 
G30 = 1.81 
G3l = 0.093 
G32 = 1.126 
G33 = 1.126 
G34 = 0.093 
G35 = 2.038 
G36 = 0.093 
G37 = 1.126 
~ 3 8  = 0.0858 
BTU/hr-OF 
1 1  
1 1  
11 
1 1  
1 1  
11 
11 
1 1  
1 1  
1 1  
11 
I t  
11 
1 1  
11 
1 1  
1 1  
1 1  
13 
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Non-Radiative Conductances (continued) 
G39 = 0.093 BTIJ/k-'F ~ 6 1  = 1.273 
G40 = 
G41 = 
G42 = 
G43 = 
G44 = 
G45 = 
~46 = 
G47 = 
G48 = 
G49 = 
~ 5 0  =
~ 5 1  = 
~ 5 2  =
G53 = 
G54 = 
G55 = 
~56 = 
G57 = 
G58 = 
G59 = 
~ 6 0  =
1.126 
2.038 
1.126 
2 . 038 
0.093 
,I. 126 
1.126 
1- 273 
1.187 
3.659 
. 934 
6.29 
0.934 
0.097 
0 . 1332 
3.659 
2.54 
1.187 
1.095 
1.126 
0.0857 
11 
11 
11 
1 1  
11 
1 1  
11  
11 
I 1  
I1  
II 
I 1  
I 1  
I 1  
I I  
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
1 1  
~ 6 2  =
G63 = 
~ 6 4  =
G65 = 
G66 = 
G67 = 
G68 = 
G69 = ,  
~ 7 0  = 
~ 7 1  =
~ 7 2  = 
G73 = 
G74 = 
(375 = 
~ 7 6  = 
G77 = 
G78 = 
G79 = 
G80 = 
~ 8 1  =
~ 8 2  =
1.126 
0.093 
2 . 038 
1.126 
0.910 
0.0905 
1.095 
2.585 
3.150 
2 395 
3.01 
1.518 
0.937 
1.518 
2 . 494 
0 0 937 
2 . 494 
1.945 
1.945 
1.945 
1,945 
BTU/~- 'F  
I t  
11 
i1 
I I  
1 1  
11 
1 1  
1 1  
1 1  
11 
1 1  
11 
11 
11 
I I  
11 
11 
11 
1 1  
I t  
1 1  
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Non-Radiative Conductances (continued) 
G83 = 1.945 BTU/hr- F G89 = 0.2443 B T U / ~ - ~ F  0 
~ 8 4  = 1.945 I t  GgO = 0.2443 11 
G85 = 2.065 11 G9l = 0.2452 I t  
G86 = 2,065 If GlOO = 22,901 I1 
I t  G87 = 1.310 G l O l  = 23.239 I t  
G88 = 0.2452 I t  G 1 0 2  = 10,642 11 
Radiative Conductances 
G92 = 4.375 x lo-' BTU/hr-0R4 Gg8 = 5.070 x s r U / h - O R 4  
G93 = 4.895 x 10-l' " G99 = 4.675 x 10-l' I t  
G94 = 1.760 x 10-l' I t  G 1 0 3  = 5.02 x 1 1  
G95 = 4,215 x " G104 = 3.31 x I t  
G96 = 5.585 x ' I  ~ 1 0 5  = 3.485 x *' 
G97 = 4.215 x IO-" " 
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APPEKDIX G 
STRUCI'URAL ANALYSIS 
ELIETRICAL PROTECTIVE SYSTEM M0DUI;E 
G- 1 
J Engineer 0. H e  Can0 Approved 
1 OBJEC!TIVE: 
P Evaluate structural i n t eg r i ty  of part (casting) 
yl 
ASSUMPTIONS : 
- i  1. Drawings Dimensional j 
2. oqec. ~ Loads 
File:  SS 1090-02 , 
REm,RENCES (Analysis Methods ) : 
4 1  
Std. Analyses : 
L.3 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
I 
b d  1 Part is acceptable. 
f'"] 
' $  
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S, L. Bradley 
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Engineer J e  ?hen File: SS 1090-03 
OBJECTIVE: 
To calculate s t resses  and sign-out drawings. 
ASSumPTI ORs : 
20 g loadings assumed and used, 
RFF$flE1NCES (Analysis Methods): 
l?XGULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
1, Reactor-Indicator Cover (Dwg;. 1267813) 
2, 
A11 st resses  are wi th in  aUowables and with suf f ic ien t  margins f o r  20 g loadings, 
Relocate tie-down screw i n se r t  t o  give bettex 
edge distance (or iginal  018" edge distance fo r  #lO-32 screws) 
Corrected torque values for #10-32 and #8-32 screws (Dwg, 267812). 
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APPENDIX H 
PROTECTIVE SYSTEN FOR SNAP-8 FLIGHT APPLICATION 
H- 1 
AUTHOR(S): 
TI TL Es 
DIVISION swp-8 
TM 4931:6bi405 
DATE 16 June 1966- 
w. 0. 0740-05 - 2041 
TECHNl CAL MEMO RAN DUM 
S .  L. Bradley 
Protective System for SNAP-8 Flight Applicati-on 
ABSTRACT 
A general concept of a f l i g h t  protect ive system i s  suggested and a 
spec i f ic  c i r c u i t  which w i l l  accomplish t h e  desired r e s u l t s  i s  recommended, 
APPROVER 
DEPARTMENT HEAD - 
/ . S ,  Le Bradley 
NOTE: The information i n  t h i s  document i s  subject t o  revision a s  
analysis  progresses and addi t ional  data are  acquired. 
H-2 
AEROJ ET-GEN ERAL CORPORATION 
COPY NO. 
PAGES: 
1. The f l i g h t  protective system can only protect the Elec t r i ca l  Generatirg 
System (EGX) f o r  f a u l t s  occurring i n  the  vehicle load. 
t o  protect the plant against faz;tlts in the  EGS, f o r  i f  any of the loads o r  c i r c u i t s  
i n  the E lec t r i ca l  Generating System (EGS) are fau l tzd  or  los t ,  the  plant w i l l  f a i l .  
It. i s  therefore  possible t o  protect the EGX against %?lese fai2aes only by design- 
ing the  e l e c t r i c a l  wiring system and compoxents wit21 eno@il mrgizl ar~d se&.ndaxy 
s o  t h a t  e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t s  and f a i lu re s  i n  the EGS are v w y  i;32ikely0 
It will xch be psssible  
2 ,  Although the  exact nature of the  load t5e  SrS4P-8 EGS w i l l .  supply i s  
unknown, The nature cf the  faipnres azid faul+,s that w i l l  occ”z i s  kimm, f o r  
they will be tke  sane regardless of the  tyye of load. ‘Eke faults and failweas 
will be three-phase f a u l t s  l ine-to-line,  skgle-phase f a u l t s  line-ko-1ine9 agd 
l ine-to-neutral ,  overloads aEd open c i r cu i t s .  
3. ALt7=Loxgk there  will be a high emrea t  w3en t!iere i s  a tkEee-phase 
fzult, the impedance t c  the  f a u l t  w i l l  be mostly react ive so there w i l l  be l i t t l e  
r e a l  power in the f a u l t  current and the  C,ur;bine w i l l  be exsea t i a l ly  u_n_lGaded, 
Because tke f a u l t  w i l l  reduce the  a l te rna tor  output volt8,;ge t o  a very luw level,  
the  p a r a s i t i c  load system cannot app1’j appreciable load t o  xaintairi dhe speed 
a t  normal levels .  There i s  thus very l i t t l e  103,d on tlie T U ,  couseyuently it 
overspeeds. 
4, The a l te rna tor  and the  exc i ta t ion  system are  capable of prodm5rg 
kigk short c i r c a i t  currents when f a u l t s  occuro -4 t5ree-pkase -fa;ul-L will produce 
2.,85 Per kit (P,U. ) current (2-85 tbnes ra ted cxjxrent); & siiglz-phase li3e-tgc- 
l i ne  fault will produce 3,95 P,U, c-urent,  and a si-%le-phase l ine- to-aeutral  
f a u l t  will produce 4-2 P.U, cwrent .  The windizg of the a l t s rmtor  can withstand 
4,2 P,U. current only about 18 seconds before the winding temperatme r i s e s  t o  
approximately 630’F (316Oc) ., This teaperatme will sooa damage the i n su la t io r  
su f f i c i en t ly  t o  cause winding f a i lu re  
H- 3 
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5. It i s  clear  that some protective act ion should be takeng f o r  if the  
Vehicle Load Breaker (VB) i s  opened when a f a u l t  occurs, EGS can continue t o  
operate and produce power. 
danger of destroying i t s e l f  because of overspeed or because of high a l te rna tor  
winding temperature caused by high f a u l t  currents or  both. 
Whereas i f  the VLB i s  not opened, the T U  i s  i n  
6. The f l i g h t  protective system must be highly r e l i ab le  i n  order to 
perform successfu.lly0 
signals and consis tent ly  provide t r i p  s ignals  when t r u e  faldlts occur e Performance 
l i ke  t h i s  CA only be real ized because of iriherent r e l i a b i l i t y  achieved by simpli- 
c i t y  of c i rcui t ry ,  na tura l  ruggedness of components, and i n t e g r i t y  of fabr icat ion.  
When l e s s  r e l i ab le  components cannot be avoided redundancy of components and/or 
For over 10,000 hours the system must avoid any f a l s e  
conservative ra t ings  a re  essent ia l .  
11. AVAILABLE SYSmMS 
1, A review of other protective systems has established t h a t  they a re  
not su i tab le  f o r  use i n  the SNAP-80 
are  based on prevention of damage t o  t h e  power generating components (whereas the  
goal f o r  the SNAP-8 PCS EGS i s  t o  keep it i n  operation) and depend upon disconnecting 
them from the  r e s t  of the  system, removing the f i e l d  exci ta t ion and reducing o r  
removing the  shaf t  input power. I n  systems containing multiple generators, the 
load can be reduced o r  redis t r ibuted to maintain the  essent ia l  functions. I n  
single generator systems, the  same type of protection i s  used, but w i t h  an 
emergency power supply t o  maintain the e s sen t i a l  functions. 
I n  most cases9 the  a i r c r a f t  protective systems 
111, FLIGHT SYSTEM CONCEPT 
1, The protective system concept suggested here i s  based on an e f fo r t  t o  
maintain the  EGS i n  operation fo r  as  long as possible,  
load w i l l  be detected and the  load breaker opened t o  i so l a t e  the  f a u l t  and 
maintain the  EGS i n  operation. The load breaker w i l l  be reclosed when tke  output 
voltage returns  t o  normal, and normal operation can be resumed i f  the fault has 
been cleared. 
operation w i l l  be repeated. 
opportunity to resume completely n o m 1  operation i f  the fzmlt has been cleared, 
If the  f a u l t  s t i l l  ex i s t s  when the  breaker i s  reclosed, (since norm1 voltage 
outpdt conditions w i l l  have been reestablished i n  the  EGS) another 8ttempt can 
Faul ts  i n  the  vehicle 
If the  fault condition pers i s t s ,  the  breaker t r ipping and c l o s i ~  
This method of operation w i l l  give the  EGS every 
be made t o  c lear  the f a u l t  by e i the r  burning it c lear  or by trippivlg a bran& 
or individual c i r cu i t  protective device i n  the vehicle load system. 
2. 
the  EGS, 
operation of the system and cannot be i so la ted  without resul t ing i n  system f a i l w e .  
No attempt w i l l  be made t o  detect  or c lear  i n t e rna l  f z u l t s  within 
Each major pcmer consuming or producing component i s  e s sen t i a l  t o  %he 
3e It i s  considered necessary t o  detect  single or three p b s e  f a u l t s  
t h a t  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  excessive cmrent  i n  the  system, w i l l  cause excessive voltage 
unbalance or w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  overspeed of the  TAA. 
4. Faults t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  overload and overcurrent w i l l  decrease the  
output voltage d i r ec t ly  as a r e su l t  of a l te rna tor  or exci te r  l h i t a t i o n s  o r  
ind i rec t ly  as a r e su l t  of the decrease i n  turbine speed and the proportional 
re la t ionship of the frequency and output voltage, 
or multiple phases w i l l ,  r e su l t  i n  a d i r ec t  reduction of voltage. 
single phase sensing on each of three phases w i l l  provide protect ion fo r  e i the r  
single or multiple phase f au l t s .  
Low impedance faults on single 
The use of 
5. Faul ts  t h a t  can cause e i the r  an increase i n  voltage or a3 increase i n  
frequelncy without a decrease i n  voltage w i l l  not be eliminated by openi-ng the  
breaker and therefore do not need t o  be sensed separately. 
6, A l l  vehicle-load f a u l t s  which can be cleared by opening of the  vehicle 
load breaker w i l l  be sensed by t h i s  system. 
7 .  The protective system designed f o r  ground t e s t ing  of the  PCS as  
shown i n  schematic diagram 095381, Figure 1, i s  bas ica l ly  an under-voltage protec- 
t i v e  system. It, however, does include an. over-frequency protective c i r cu i t  
which w i l l  not be needed on a f l i g h t  system, 
8. The over-frequency c i r cu i t  protects  the TAA from f a i l u r e  of the  speed 
control subsystem or loss of Load due t o  l i ne  breakage or other open c i r cu i t  or 
any other nalfwsction which would cause overspeed of the TAA. bzt which i s  not 
accompanied by a drop i n  voltage. Hawever, t o  protect  t%e TA-4 from overspeed 
-the PCX must be shut down. This of course v io la tes  the principle t h a t  the  EGS 
should be kept i n  operation as  long as  possible, so  over-frquency protzction 
should not be included i n  a f l ig%t  protective system. 
H- 5 
V I  SPECIFIC CIRCUITRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. ' A  28 V DC power requirement i s  shown on the schematic diagram 095381, 
If a r e s t a r t  capabi l i ty  i s  included for the  EGS, t h i s  power w i l l  be Figure 1, 
available from the bat terywhich must be kept charged fo r  the  full mission. 
no r e s t a r t  capabi l i ty  i s  necessary, a means w i l l  be provided t o  t r i p  the  Vehicle 
Load Breakex- when there is  l i t t l e  voltage output of t he  a l te rna tor .  This can be 
done with a current transformer 
If 
power supply ox by capaci-bor energy storage. 
2. As  shown on drawing 095381, Figure 1, undervoltage sensing i s  
accomplished by means of a b i s tab le  magnetic amplifier which receives the  input 
from three phases i n t o  one control winding. When input voltage i s  above an 
established value, the b is tab le  stays on and r e l ay  K l  i s  energized, 
phase voltage or a l l  three drop belaw established levels  the b is tab le  w i U  switch 
off and r e l ay  K.l w i l l  bede-energized. 
load breaker (VLB) i s  closed. 
If any one 
When r e l ay  K l  i s  energized, the vehicle 
When r e l ay  K1 i s  de-energized, the Vlls $s t r ipped,  
3e To prevent t r ipping on t ransients ,  a time delay i s  provided which w i l l  
allow the system t o  r ide  through f a s t  voltage dips caused by load changes. 
i s  a lso a time delay provided on reclosing of the breaker. This i s  provided t o  
allow the regulating system t o  rees tab l i sh  normal voltage conditions .before the 
VI.8 is  reclosed, The time delays are obtained by means of a time delay winding 
There 
i n  the magnetic amplifier and by RC c i r cu i t s .  
require3 
No separate time delay relays are 
V CONCLUSION 
1. A protective system spec i f ica l ly  developed for the  peculiar require- 
No standard system i s  available which ments of t he  SWP-8 EGS must be provided. 
w i l l  s a t i s f y  these unique requirements. 
e s sen t i a l ly  from simplici ty  of c i rcui t ry ,  through use of inherently sturdy 
components and by careFul.pknowldgeable and experienced f a b r i c a t b n .  
The system must achieve high r e l i a b i l i t y  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The protective requirements f o r  the  SNAP-^ EGS depend t o  some extent 
on the function of the system. If the function of the  EGS i s  t o  operate 
i n  ground development t e s t s ,  the protect ive requirements are  d i f fe ren t  than 
fo r  an unmanned power p lan t  operating i n  space. Consequently, t h i s  discussion 
of protective requirements w i l l  be divided i n t o  three functional c lasses:  
Class I - Protective System fo r  Development Ground Testing 
Class I1 - Protective System fo r  Space Operation - Unmanned 
Class 111 - Protective System for  Space Operation - Manned 
Each of these classes  has d i s t i n c t  protective requirements; each i s  
somewhat l i ke  the other,  but each i s  d i f fe ren t  from the other, 
This discussion w i l l  be concerned with the protective system f o r  the 
e l e c t r i c a l  system only, Protection fo r  the hydraulic system involving press- 
ure, flow, e t c .  w i l l  be considered separately. 
11. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF FAULTS AND FAILURES 
The most common e l e c t r i c a l  hazard against  which protection i s  required 
i s  the short  c i r c u i t ,  and t h i s  f a u l t  w i l l  be given special  consideration. 
However, there are  other f a u l t s  and f a i lu re s  which must be considered. Open 
c i r cu i t s ,  overvoltage, undervoltage, overfrequency, underfrequency, over- 
temperature and unbalanced voltage a re  f au l ty  conditions which must be considered. 
These f a i lu re s  are  not independant of each other. One f a u l t  may be responsible 
f o r  the appearance of other undesirable conditions. For example, a l ine-to- 
ground short  c i r c u i t  i n  a grounded system w i l l  not only r e su l t  i n  high current 
i n  the fau l ted  phase but w i l l  a l s o  cause low voltage across the same phase. 
I n  f a c t ,  any short  c i r c u i t  t h a t  r e su l t s  i n  excessive current w i l l  a l so  produce 
abnormal voltages. 
The SNAP-8 EGS i s  basical ly  d i f fe ren t  from most power systems because 
speed i s  regulated by maintaining a controlled load on the system and the voltage 
i s  regulated to a value proportional t o  frequency ra ther  than being independent 
of frequency. These unique charac te r i s t ics  have a n  important influence on the 
protective system required, 
For example, an overload beyond the a b i l i t y  
i n  a drop i n  speed and voltage, s o  tha t  overloads 
of the system w i l l  r e su l t  
need not be sensed d i rec t ly ,  
but can be detected by an undervoltage sensor. 
Also, a subs tan t ia l  loss of load caused by an open c i r cu i t  or f o r  
other reasons w i l l  r e su l t  i n  overspeed of the Turbine Alternator, s o  t h i s  
component must be protected by an overspeed or overfrequency sensor which 
w i l l  sense an overspeed and shut the loop down rapidly enough t o  prevent 
damage t o  the TAA. 
The SNAP-8 a l te rna tor  and the exci ta t ion system are capable of producing 
high short  c i r c u i t  currents when f a u l t s  occur. A three-phase f a u l t  w i l l  produce 
2.85 Per Unit (P.U,) current (2.85 times rated current) ;  a single-phase l ine-to- 
l i ne  f a u l t  w i l l  produce 3.05 P.U. current,  and a single-phase l ine-to-neutral  
f a u l t  w i l l  produce 4.2 P.U. current. The winding of the a l te rna tor  can with- 
stand 4.2 P.U. current only abaut 18 seconds before the winding temperature 
r i s e s  t o  approximately 600'~ (316'~). This temperature w i l l  soon damage the 
insulat ion su f f i c i en t ly  t o  cause winding fa i lure .  i 
Although there w i l l  be a high current when there i s  a three-phase f a u l t ,  
the impedance t o  the f a u l t  w i l l  be mostly reactive s o  there w i l l  be l i t t l e  r e a l  
power i n  the f a u l t  current and the turbine w i l l  be essent ia l ly  unloaded. 
Because the f a u l t  w i l l  reduce the a l te rna tor  output voltage t o  a very low 
level ,  the  parasi t ic- load speed-control system cannot apply appreciable load 
t o  maintain the speed a t  normal levels.  There i s  thus very l i t t l e  load on the 
TAA; consequently it overspeeds. Thus a three-phase short  c i r cu i t  requires 
the same protect ive device as a l o s s  of load on the TAA - an overfrequency 
sensor w i t h  the a b i l i t y  t o  shut the loop down rapidly.  
A l l  of the f a u l t  conditions discussed can occur i n  any SNAP-8 power 
system regardless of the c lass  of service it  i s  providing. However, the pro- 
tec t ive  act ion tha t  should be taken i s  d i f fe ren t  f o r  different  classes of 
service, s o  the protective system discussion t h a t  follows will be divided 
i n t o  three classes.  
111. CLASS I - PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT GROUND TESTING 
A. REQUIREMENTS 
The primary purpose of the protect ive system fo r  development 
ground t e s t ing  i s  t o  prevent damage t o  the Power Conversion System equipment, 
A shut down of the t e s t  f a c i l i t y  w i l l  be tolerated t o  prevent damage t o  the 
TAA, the pumps, the e l e c t r i c a l  equipment and other PCS apparatus. It i s  
therefore required t h a t  f a i lu re s  anywhere i n  the PCS or t e s t  support equip- 
ment be detected and protect ive ac t ion  taken t o  minimize damage. 
i s  a l so  important t h a t  f a l s e  shutdowns do not occur because endurance oper- 
a t ion  with a m i n i m u m  number of shutdowns i s  one of the  goals of the t e s t ing  
It, however, 
program. 
A protect ive system f o r  ground t e s t ing  must provide protection f o r  
f a u l t s  and failures i n  the PCS o r  i n  the Vehicle Load. It must open the 
vehicle load breaker when f a u l t s  occur i n  the vehicle load. It must shut the 
plant  down and remove the f i e l d  exc i ta t ion  from the a l te rna tor  f o r  faults i n  
the PCS. 
The Turbine Alternator Assembly (TU) must be automatically protected 
against  destructive overspeeds and damaging f a u l t  currents. 
It i s  not necessary t h a t  the pump motors be automatically protected 
from overload currents,  but they should have overload alarms which sense high 
currents and high temperatures, Action t o  correct the condition exis t ing can 
then be taken by the operator. 
The Speed Control, Voltage Regulator , Programmer, Protective System and 
Inverter must be provided w i t h  temperature sensing means although it doesn't 
appear necessary t o  provide f o r  high temperature alarms on these systems. The 
temperatures should be closely monitored during the i n i t i a l  operation of the 
system, but a f t e r  a f e w  hours of sa t i s fac tory  operation close monitoring will 
not be necessary. 
B. SYSTEM CONCEPT 
i 
For sensing of f a u l t s  within the Power Conversion System fPCS) 
and the Vehicle Load (VL) an under-unbalanced voltage (U-W) and overfrequency 
(OF) sensing system i s  required. 
and unbalanced voltage i n  the system, and the OF sensor w i l l  detect  Turbine 
Alternator over spe ed . 
The U - W  sensor w i l l  detect  both undervoltage 
In  order f o r  the protective system t o  distinguish between a 
f a u l t  i n  the PCS and one i n  the VL there should be two U - W  c i r cu i t s .  One 
(U-Wl) w i l l  open the Vehicle Load Breaker (VLB); the other (U-W2), which w i l l  
be delayed longer than the f i rs t ,  w i l l  s tar t  a controlled shutdown of the loop. 
U-W1 w i l l  protect  fo r  f a u l t s  i n  the Vehicle Load. 
U-W2 w i l l  protect  f o r  f a u l t s  i n  the Power Conversion System, 
including the more severe in t e rna l  f a u l t s  i n  the al ternator .  
Both under-unbalanced voltage sensors must be set s o  they do not 
t r i p  when vehicle load is  suddenly applied. Therefore they must have a t i m e  
delay suf f ic ien t ly  long t o  ride through suddenly applied loads or  the  under- 
voltage must be s e t  low enough t h a t  t r ipping does not occur on voltage dips 
caused by suddenly applied loads. 
When an undervoltage occurs the U-W1 sensor w i l l  open'the VLB ' 
before the U-W2 sensor starts a loop shutdown. If the f a u l t  i s  i n  the vehicle 
load, normal voltage conditions w i l l  be restored and U-W2 sensor w i l l  no* ac t .  
This i s  accomplished by providing a longer time delay fo r  act ivat ion of the 
U-W2 sensor than f o r  the U-W1 sensor. In  other respects the two sensors are  
exnected t o  be ident ical .  If the f a u l t  i s  i n  the PCS the U-W1 sensor w i l l  
f i rst  open the VLB, but since t h i s  act ion w i l l  not c lear  the f a u l t  the abnormal 
voltage condition w i l l  p e r s i s t  s o  a predetermined time a f t e r  the VLB opens, 
the U-W2 sensor w i l l  i n i t i a t e  a controlled shutdown of the system.' 
These two U-W sensors w i l l  detect  nearly a l l  the s ignif icant  
f a u l t s  t ha t  could occur i n  the vehicle load and i n  the PCS e l e c t r i c a l  system. 
However, they w i l l  not detect  a s i tua t ion  i n  which the voltage does not drop 
but the load on the TAA i s  lo s t .  This i s  a condition which could occur i f  the 
vehicle load i s  l o s t  by open c i r c u i t  f a u l t  of a l l  three phases provided the 
f a u l t  r e su l t s  i n  loss of the  pa ras i t i c  load system. 
I 
If t h i s  s i tua t ion  should develop the turbine w i l l  overspeed. The 
al ternator  output voltage w i l l  remain balanced but w i l l  r iqe  proportional t o  
speed. The U-W sensors w i l l  not be actuated, s o  no protective act ion w i l l  
be taken. An overvoltage (OV) sensor would detect  t h i s  described malfunction 
and provide a loop shutdown signal .  
an overspeed which was caused by a l o s s  of voltage output and consequently a 
lcss of load on the TAA. This s i tua t ion  would be detected by the U-W sensors 
and the U-W2 sensor would i n i t i a t e  a controlled shutdown a f t e r  a preset  time 
de lay. 
However, the f O V )  sensor would not detect  
! 
The delay i n  s ta r t  of a shutdown might r e s u l t  i n  overspeed 
suf f ic ien t ly  high t o  damage the TAA. It i s  therefore unlikely tha t  an over- 
voltage fOV) sensor w i l l  be sa t i s fac tory  t o  provide protect ion f o r  a l l  over- 
speed conditions. 
To provide protect ion fo r  TAA overspeed an overfrequency fOF) 
sensor should be provided. This sensor must be capable of detecting an over- 
frequency malfunction even though the a l te rna tor  output voltage i s  higher than 
normal or i f  the voltage has been reduced t o  zero. This OF sensor must ac t  
t o  shut the loop down su f f i c i en t ly  f a s t  t o  prevent damage t o  the TAA. 
With the three sensors, U - W 1 ,  U-W2 and the  OF, there i s  no 
need fo r  an overload sensor per se .  
Real power, kilowatt ,  overloads e i the r  i n  the vehicle load or i n  
the PCS w i l l  r e su l t  i n  a reduction i n  p a r a s i t i c  load a s  the speed control  
system attempts t o  maintain rated speed. When the speed control  system can 
reduce the p a r a s i t i c  load no fur ther ,  and i f  there i s  s t i l l  an overload on 
the system, the  speed and the voltage w i l l  decrease below normal u n t i l  the 
under voltage se t t i ng  of U - W 1  and U-W2 i s  reached. A t  t h i s  point the 
sensors w i l l  be actuated, the  VLB w i l l  be opened and a controlled shutdown 
w i l l  be s ta r ted ,  providing protect ion for the  overload condition. 
A d i f f e r e n t i a l  protect ion scheme w i l l  p ro tec t  the Alternator from 
phase-to-ground f a u l t s  within the Alternator winding. The Under-Unbalanced 
Sensor U-W2 w i l l  a l so  pro tec t  the Alternator against  the mere severe in t e rna l  
f au l t s .  However, it w i l l  not pro tec t  f o r  f a u l t s  a t  a point near the neut ra l  
point  or  fo r  high resis tance f a u l t s  which do not r e su l t  i n  excessive currents. 
To obtain the  maximum protect ion from in t e rna l  Alternator f a u l t s  
a d i f f e r e n t i a l  protect ive scheme should be added t o  the protective system. 
When it functions it should s tar t  a loop shutdown and a f t e r  an appropriate 
time delay it should operate the f i e l d  shorting switch. 
A d i f f e r e n t i a l  protect ive system i s  complicated, requiring four 
current transformers and a d i f f e r e n t i a l  r e l ay  device. It should be included 
i n  the Development Ground Testing System but not i n  a space system. 
C. GROUNDING OF ALTZRNATOR NEUTRAL 
If the neutral  of the Alternator winding i s  grounded, f a u l t s  t o  
ground w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  high current and low or  unbalanced voltages. 
conditions w i l l  be detected by the  protect ive system and appropriate act ion 
taken. Also i f  the  neutral  i s  grounded, a d i f f e r e n t i a l  protective scheme 
w i l l  be able t o  detect  i n t e rna l  ground f a u l t s  within the Alternator that  
cannot be detected by any other means. 
These 
If the neut ra l  i s  not grounded f a u l t  currents w i l l  not flow when 
a single short  t o  ground occurs, s o  the protect ive system w i l l  not take any 
protective action. Thus the system w i l l  continue t o  operate with one ground 
f a u l t ,  If a second ground f a u l t  occurs the protective system w i l l  be actuated. 
It i s  recommended tha t  for  the  Development Ground Testing System 
the neutral  of the Alternator be so l id ly  grounded. The Alternator neut ra l  
should not be grounded when the EGS i s  operating as a space power plant .  
D. OTHER PROTECTNE DEVICES 
There are  other conditions f o r  which protection could be added, 
but such protection does not seem j u s t i f i e d  because of the increased compli- 
cation, 
1. Reverse Phase Rotation Sensor 
This device would only be useful  when the system i s  f i r s t  
s t a r t ed  or a f t e r  a repair .  
t h i s  device checks only on workmanship and should not be required as a perman- 
ent device. 
The extra  complication i s  not j u s t i f i ed ,  because 
2. Over Current or Over Load Sensor 
Neither of these devices i s  required because damaging overloads 
w i l l  a l so  r e s u l t  i n  undervoltage which w i l l  operate the undervoltage sensor t o  
provide required protection. 
E. STJMMARY 
Table 1 summarizes the possible f a u l t  conditions tha t  could be 
experienced and the protect ive act ion tha t  w i l l  be taken by the proposed Protect-  
ive System, 
IV. CLASS I1 - PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FOR SPACE OPERATION - UNMANNED 
A. REQUImMENTS 
The protective system fo r  an unmanned space power system can only 
protect  the E lec t r i ca l  Generating System fEGS) for f a u l t s  occurring i n  the 
vehicle load. It w i l l  not be possible t o  protect  the plant  against  f a u l t s  
i n  the EGS, for  i f  any of the loads or  c i r c u i t s  i n  the E lec t r i ca l  Generating 
System IEGS) a re  faul ted or l o s t ,  the p lan t  w i l l  f a i l .  
t o  protect  the EGS against  these failures only by designing the e l e c t r i c a l  w i r -  
ing system and components with enough margin and redundancy s o  t h a t  e l e c t r i c a l  
f a u l t s  and f a i lu re s  i n  the EGS a re  very unlikely. 
It i s  therefore possible 
If the Vehicle Load Breaker (VLB) i s  opened when a f a u l t  occurs 
i n  the vehicle load, the EGS can continue t o  operate and produce power. Whereas 
i f  the VLB i s  not opened, the TAA i s  in  danger of destroying i t s e l f  because of 
overspeed or because of high a l te rna tor  winding temperature caused by high 
f a u l t  currents or  both, 
The protective system must be highly r e l i ab le  i n  order t o  perform 
successfully. For over 10,000 hours the system must avoid any f a l se  signals 
and consis tent ly  provide t r i p  s ignals  when t rue f a u l t s  occur. Performance l i ke  
t h i s  can only be real ized because of inherent r e l i a b i l i t y  achieved by simplicity 
of c i rcu i t ry ,  natural  ruggedness of components, and in t eg r i ty  of fabrication. 
When 1 ess  r e l i ab le  components cannot be avoided, redundancy of components and/or 
conservative rat ings a re  essent ia l .  \ 
B. SYSTEM CONCEPT 
The protective system concept suggested here i s  based on the in ten t  
t o  maintain the EGS i n  operation f o r  as long as possible.  Faults i n  the vehicle 
load w i l l  be detected and the load breaker opened t o  i so la te  the f a u l t  and main- 
t a i n  the EGS i n  operation. The load breaker w i l l  be reclosed when the output 
voltage returns  t o  normal, and normal operation can be resumed i f  the f a u l t  has 
been cleared. 
operation w i l l  be repeated. 
opportunity t o  resume completely normal operation if the f a u l t  has been cleared. 
If the f a u l t  s t i l l  ex i s t s  when the breaker i s  reclosed, (s ince normal voltage 
If the f a u l t  condition pe r s i s t s ,  the breaker t r ipping and closing 
This method of operation w i l l  give the EGS every 
output conditions w i l l  have been reestablished i n  the EGS) another attempt 
can be made t o  c lear  the  f au l t  by e i ther  burning it clear  or by tripping a 
branch or individual c i r c u i t  protective devide i n  the vehicle load system. 
This opening and reclosing action w i l l  continue u n t i l  the f a u l t  i s  'cleared or 
u n t i l  the VLB i s  locked open by an external signal.  
> *  
No attempt w i l l  be made t o  detect  or clear  in te rna l  f a u l t s  within 
the EGS. 
the operation of the system and cannot be isolated without resul t ing i n  system 
fa i lure .  
Each major power consuming or producing component i s  e s sen t i a l  t o  
It i s  considered necessary t o  detect  single or three-phase f a u l t s  
i n  the Vehicle Load t h a t  w i l l  result i n  excessive current i n  the system, w i l l  
cause excessive voltage unbalance or w i l l  r e su l t  i n  overspeed of the  T M .  
Faults t h a t  r e su l t  i n  overload and overcurrent w i l l  decrease the 
output voltage d i rec t ly  as a r e s u l t  of a l te rna tor  or  exciter l imitations o r  
indirect ly  as  a r e su l t  of the decrease in . turbine speed and the proportional 
relationship of the frequency and output voltage. Low impedance f a u l t s  on 
single or multiple phases w i l l  r e su l t  i n  a d i rec t  reduction of voltage. 
use of single phase sensing on each of three phases w i l l  provide protection 
f o r  e i ther  single or multiple phase fau l t s .  
The 
Faults t h a t  can cause e i ther  an increase i n  voltage or  an increase 
i n  frequency without a decrease i n  voltage w i l l  not be eliminated by opening 
the VLF3 and therefore do not need t o  be sensed separately. 
All vehicle-load f a u l t s  which can be cleared by opening of the 
vehicle load breaker w i l l  be sensed by t h i s  system. 
C. SUMMARY 
The Protective System f o r  unmanned space operation w i l l  consist  
of an undervoltage f W )  sensor which w i l l  open the Vehicle Load Breaker fVLB) 
when a f au l t  i n  the Vehicle Load is  detected. It w i l l  reclose the VLB a f t e r  
normal voltage conditions a re  restored. This opening and reclosing action 
w i l l  be repeated u n t i l  the f a u l t  i s  cleared or  u n t i l  the VLB i s  locked open 
by external signal.  
V. CLASS 111 - PROTECTIVE SYSTEM FOR SPACE OPERATION - MANNED 
A. RZQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of a protective system f o r  a manned space power system 
i s  two fold:  The equipment t h a t  i s  repairable o r  replacable i n  space must 
be protected s o  tha t  it sustains minimum damage when a f a u l t  or f a i lu re  occurs. 
1 2 )  Equipment tha t  i s  not repairable or  replacable i n  space must be kept i n  
service as long as possible even though t h a t  equipment may be destroyed. 
For the purpose of t h i s  discussion the following assumptions a re  
f 1) 
made : 
1. An astronaut w i l l  be able t o  monitor instruments and make 
limited corrective adjustments from time t o  time, but w i l l  not be i n  regular 
attendance. 
2 .  Spare e l e c t r i c a l  modules, TAA and PMA's, w i l l  be available t o  
the astronaut fo r  replacement of defective units.  
3.  An astronaut w i l l  be able t o  determine which e l e c t r i c a l  mod- 
ules and components a re  malfunctioning and w i l l  be capable of replacing them 
w i t h  spare uni t s  a f t e r  the EGS i s  shut down. 
4. The EGS can be shut down without causing damage which would 
prevent r e s t a r t  of the system. 
5. The system can be shut down quickly s o  tha t  damaging overspeed 
of the Turbine Alternator Assembly can be avoided. 
Any f au l t s  or f a i lu re s  which would r e su l t  i n  destructive overspeed 
or destructive temperatures t o  the Turbine Alternator must be sensed and pro- 
tect ive action taken t o  prevent damage. 
Faults i n  the vehicle load which are  not cleared by loca l  protective 
equipment must be sensed and the vehicle load breaker fVLB) opened. 
for the Class I1 system, an undervoltage sensing system which opens the VLB and 
then recloses it a f t e r  a t i m e  delay i s  the recomended way t o  protect  for  vehicle 
A s  discussed 
load fau l t s .  
Faults within the PCS must be handled i n  a different  way than those 
i n  the vehicle load. PCS fau l t s  cannot be cleared by opening a protective 
breaker t o  i so l a t e  the f a i lu re  from the rest of the system, because i f  t h i s  i s  
done a v i t a l  function w i l l  be l o s t  and the system w i l l  stop operating, with 
the poss ib i l i t y  t ha t  damage w i l l  r e su l t .  When an e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t  within the 
PCS i s  detected, the only act ion t h a t  can be taken is  t o  shut the system down 
i n  such a way as t o  minimize the resu l t ing  damage. 
B. SYSTEM CONCEPT 
For sensing of f a u l t s  within the PCS and the VL an undervoltage- 
voltage unbalance and overfrequency sensing system i s  required ident ica l  t o  
t h a t  recommended fo r  the Class I system, except that  the U-W1 Sensor which 
protects  against  f a u l t s  i n  the Vehicle Load w i l l  be able t o  open and reclose 
the VLB i n  the manner described i n  the discussion of the Class I1 system. 
This protect ive system consisting of two undervoltage-unbalanced 
voltage sensors and an overfrequency sensor w i l l  detect  a l l  f a u l t s  which could 
r e su l t  i n  rapid and catastrophic f a i lu re  of an e l e c t r i c a l  element. If a f a u l t  
occurs i n  the Vehicle Load the VLB w i l l  be opened, The VLB w i l l  be reclosed 
when the output voltage returns  t o  normal. This protection method w i l l  give 
the EGS every opportunity t o  resume completely normal operation i f  the f a u l t  
i n  the Vehicle Load clears .  
The protective system proposed i s  not complex. It consists of only 
three sensors which can detect  any of the f a u l t  conditions which would cause a 
replaceable item t o  f a i l .  The simplicity of the system minimizes the failures 
t h a t  can occur t o  the protective system which would cause f a l se  shutdowns of 
the system. 
c. SUMMllliY 
The Protective System recommended f o r  manned space operation w i l l  
consist  of two under voltage-unbalanced voltage sensors, U-'w1 and U-W2, and 
an  overfrequency (OF) sensor. 
provide the required protection. 
No other protect ive sensors a re  required t o  
TABU 1 
Fault o r  Failure 
i n  Vehicle. Load 
3 phase Short 
1 phase Short 
Line t o  Ground 
1 phase Short 
Line t o  Line 
Overload 
Open Circuit  
Fault or Failure 
i n  PCS 
3 phase Short 
1 phase Short 
,“Line t o  Ground 
1 phase Short 
Line t o  Line 
In te rna l  Faults 
i n  Pump Mot or s 
Phase %o 
Ground Short 
Phase t o  
Phase Short 
FAULTS AND PROTECTIVE ACTION 
FOR DEVELOPI@NT GROUND TESTING 
Condition 
Sensed 
Undervoltage U-W-1) 
Unbalanced Voltage f U-W-1) 
Unbalanced Voltage (U-W-1) 
Undervoltage (U-W-1) 
Current t o  Vehicle Load 
Condition 
Sensed 
Undervoltage f U-W2) 
Undervoltage (U-W2) 
Undervoltage (U-W2) 
Undervoltage (U-W2) 
or 
Unbalanced Currents - 
Overtemperature 
Undervoltage f U-W2) 
or 
Unbalanced Currents - 
Overtemperature 
- 
Protective 
Action 
Open VLB 
Open VLB 
Open VLE3 
Open VLB 
Operator Action 
Pr o te c t ive 
Action 
Shutdown Loop 
& Short Field 
Shutdown Loop 
& Short Field 
Shutdown Loop 
& Short Field 
Shutdown Loop & 
Short Fie  Id 
Operator Action 
Shutdown Loop & 
Short Fie  Id 
Operator Action 
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TABLE I 
Fault  or Fai lure  
i n  PCS . 
In te rna l  Faul ts  
i n  Pump Mot or s 
Open Circui t  
One Phase 
S ta l led  Motor 
In te rna l  Fault  
i n  Alternator 
Phase t o  
Ground Short 
Phase t o  
Phase Short 
Speed Control 
Failure 
.Voltage RegulaC or  
Failure 
FAULTS AND PROTECTIVE ACTION 
FOR DEVELOPMENT GROUND TESTING 
C ondi ti on 
Sensed 
Unbalanced Currents - 
Overtemperature 
Over Current - 
High Temperature 
Dif fe ren t ia l  Current 
or 
Unbalanced Voltage (U-W2) 
Unbalanced Voltage fU-W2) 
Overspeed (OF) or  
Undervoltage fU-W2) 
Undervoltage (U-W2) 
or Over Voltage 
Table 1 
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Protective 
Action 
Operator Action 
Operator Action 
Shutdown Loop 
& Short Field 
I I  I1  
Shutdown Loop 
& Short F ie ld  
Shutdown Loop 
Shutdown Loop 
Operator Action 
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SUBJECT M E R  mvIEw (Name, Part No. 1: Elec t r i ca l  Protective System Module 
9 P/N 1264931-1 
. 1 
This Design Review Check L i s t  is an in tegra l  part of the design review 
documentation package, required by Power Systems Division Procedure I - A ~ c ,  
"Design Review man. 'I 
The items specif ied on the Design Review Check L i s t  provide the basis  f o r  
a comprehensive review. However, they are not necessarily a l l  inclusive. The 
design e w i n e e r  shall be guided by the basic requirement f o r  a thorough and 
detailed evaluation of a design, as stated under Section 3, "SCOPE," of this 
procedure, and shall expand the l i s t  where necessary. 
Check L i s t  en t r i e s  shown herein provide current information on the design 
under review and are  intended t o  r e f l e c t  the basis f o r  and readiness of the 
design for en t ry  i n t o  its next evolutionary phase. 
REVIEWED BY: PRESENTED BY: 
DESIGN APPROVAL: 
~- 7e 
Quality Assurance Date 
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SUBJWT.NAME: Elec t r ica l  Protective System Module 
p / ~  1264931-1 
DESIGN ENGINEER: m 1.2-IS-69 
Item No. General 
1, 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
a. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13 
14. 
1 5  
Is the basic design objective clearly defined? 
Are the performance parameters and output requirements 
definit ive and not subject t o  misinterpretation? 
Are performance tolerances delineated? 
Are f a i lu re  c r i t e r i a  delineated? 
Were al ternate  designs considered i n  selecting the 
present design? 
Were redundancy needs analyzed and resu l t s  used i n  the 
design? 
Were simplification techniques applied? 
Was a f a i lu re  modes and effects  analysis made? 
Have adequate safety margins been incorporated for  each 
important f a i lu re  mode? 
I f  item has a limited l i f e ,  i s  it so designated? 
Have maintainability requirements been considered? 
Have previous t e s t  data and failwte reports been 
reviewed and resu l t s  used i n  the design? 
Is the  method of component identification specified? 
(The method of marking and location must be compatible 
w i t h  use-environment . ) 
If documentation of inspection findings is  required, are 
the characterist ics t o  be observed and t h e i r  frequency 
and method of inspectinn defined? 
If operational or functional acceptance tes t ing  i s  
required, a re  the parameters, mode of testing, and 
equipment defined? 
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lEFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
4936-68-011.5 
4936-68-0115 
4936-68-0115 
Concept. Des. Rev. 
354:63-147 & 095521 
1267428 
1267428 
All parts derated 
t o  30$ or lower 
1264931 
PCS-1 Log 
See Bigs ' 
I n  process 
I n  process 
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su&TEcT NAME: 
P/N ' 
Item No. General 
16. 
17 
18 
19 
20 0 
21. 
22. 
23 
24 
25. 
26. 
Are required special  inspection equfgments, tools, and 
gages defined? 
Has a procurement plan foe this  material been 
established? 
'7 
Have qwllfied and preferred par ts  been used where 
applicabxe? 
Is the design notebook and f i l e  up t o  date and ready 
fo r  audit;? 
Have provisions been made for preservation, packaging, 
handling, storage, and shipping? 
Were trade-off studies made and ut i l ized i n  selecting 
the design? 
Does the design minimize the probability o f  human 
errors during instal la t ion,  checkout, and operation, 
such as reversed connections, parts  installed backwsz.3, 
no lubrication during startup, etc.? 
Does the design make appropriate use of "fail-safe" 
devices or techniques ? 
Doe8 the design comply w i t h  a l l  applicable specifica- 
tions 1 
Were the action items frm the previous Design %view 
carried out? 
Is the design compatible w i t h  the requirements of the 
end item? 
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PSD DESIGN REVIEW CHECK LIST 
SUBJECT NAME: 
. F/N 
DESIGN ENGINEER: MD 
Item No. Mechanical 
1,. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
l.2. 
3.3 
Has a s t r e s s  analysis been made? 
!lave areas of high stress concentrations such as  sharp 
corners, r ad i i ,  and re-entrant angles been eliminated? 
Has a thermal analysis been made? 
Is t h e m 1  expansion l i ke ly  t o  have adverse effects  on 
dimensions and tolerances? 
Has a tolerance analysis been made t o  ver i fy  proper 
f i t t i n g  of par ts  under extremes of tolerance buildup? 
D i d  the tolerance analysis consider operating loads and 
temperatures? 
Were s t a t i c ,  dynamic and magnetic balances and t h e i r  
tolerances considered? 
Has a wearout analysis f o r  a l l  rubbing and ro l l ing  parts 
been glade? 
Have the ins ta l la t ion  torques and tolerances of a l l  
fasteners and their stress effects  been evaluated? 
Is the  inspectabi l i ty  of the component assured? 
the t rue  positioning and contour requirements designed 
t o  enable inspection of par t? )  
(Are 
Has the mechanical compatibility with the complete 
system been verified? 
Does mechanical design r e f l ec t  simplest method, fram 
manufacturing view, t o  meet needed parameters? 
Were environmental effects (including those of nuclear 
radiation) considered along with safety requirements 
during design? 
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Dwg. check 
Same as SCM 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
Next asqy not 
defined 
See Dwgs 
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SUBJECT NAMEk 
. DESIGN ERGINEER: DATE 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4, 
5 .  
6, 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
I t e m  No. E lec t r i ca l  
Are the  design essent ia l s  adequately defined, ipcludinP; . I *  
performance, longevity, and repe t i t ive  operation 
.%equirements ? 
Is the  design compatible with the l i f e  cycle conditions 
t o  whfch the  equipment will be exposed? 
Have the s t a b i l i t y  and drift  requirements and the  
e f fec ts  of environments on these character is t ics  been 
considered? 
Was a simplification study made and applied? 
Is redundancy employed where beneficial; .  are  possible! 
s ide e f fec ts  taken i n t o  consideration? 
Were r e l i a b i l i t y  character is t ics  considered and 
documented i n  par ts  and materials selection3 
Are the  par t  tolerances consistent with design 
requirement s? 
Was adeqwte aerating employed, including suff ic ient  
margin f o r  t rans ien ts  and other excessive s t resses? 
Can the pa r t s  operation r e s u l t  i n  undesirable conditions 
of temperature, voltage, current, or  RFI f o r  other 
parte or  assemblies? If so, was t h i s  in fo  used i n  the  
design? 
Are the d i e l ec t r i c  breakdown and insulat ion resis tance 
prop?Erties adequate f o r  the most severe environments? 
Is hermetic sealing employed where beneficial? 
Are type of connections employed re l iab le?  
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Zener diode T. C. 
See Handbook 
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or  lower 
W i l l  generat e 
ws 
See Magnetic Comp. 
Dtrgs (add nos.) 
All are welded 
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SUBJECT NAME: 
i 
Item No,  Elec t r ica l  
13. Hsve a l l  aml icable  specifications been cal led out? 
14. Have the preferred par t s  lists (JPL Specification 
No. 20061~ and CSFC-PPL-1) been used? 
15. Has expected hot spckt temperatures been determined 
16, 
and considered? 
 as effect  of component operation on primary power 
wave form been conskdered? 
17. Has nuclear radiation environment e f fec ts  been 
considered? 
IiOTE: The following e l ec t r i ca l  character is t ics  should be 
considered: inductance, capacLtance, resistance, 
sensi t ivi ty ,  leakage, insulation, shielding; 
dis tor t ion,  gain, phase, attenuation; slope, 
harmonics, eddy currents; time, spikes, peaks, 
contac+i resistance, contact rating, torque, wire s ies  
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AGC, J'PL 
Q,PL-6106 
4942-69-0095 
Similar to SCM 
S i i i h r  to SCM 
PSD DESIGN REVIEW CHECK &IST 
SUBJECT NAME: 
P/N , 
I t e m  NO., Materials 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
? *  
6. 
71 
a. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Are a l l  materials adequately ident i f ied by MIL, Fed, 
AGC, or canparable gpecifications?* 
Is the source of supply specified fo r  qualified/ 
preferred materials? 
Are the strength characterist ics of the materials 
including tens i le ,  compressive, shear, yield, bending, 
creep, and fat igue sat isfactory fo r  intended use? 
Is each material employed within l i m i t s  defined by i ts  
endurance l imi t  curve? 
Have adequate safety margins been used t o  provide 
protection from fa i lu re  due t o  corrosion, vibration, 
shock, fatigue, and other stress factors?  
Are the hardness, duc t i l i ty ,  and other character is t ics  
sui table  fo r  both the manufacturing processes and 
application? 
W i l l  the material character is t ics  be s ignif icant ly  
changed by exposure t o  environments, par t icular ly  
radiation? 
Are the special  inspection and test processes 
compatible with the par t s  and materials? 
Are the thermal expansion characterist ics sui table  
fo r  the intended use? 
W i l l  the materials be compatible w i t h  mating parts,  
f luids ,  and gases and not ac t  as  ca ta ly t ic  agents? 
Does each material have sui table  e l ec t r i ca l  and 
magnetic properties f o r  i t s  application? 
* The order of precedence fo r  specifications must meet 
MIL-STD-143 requirements. 
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Similar t o  SCM 
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Threshold of a l l  
parts 100 t ' imes  
greater than dose 
op 367736 
Similar t o  SCM 
Similar t o  SCM 
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PSD JESIGN FlEVIEM CHECK LIST 
Item No.  Materials 
12. Have adequgte metallurgical controls been imposed t o  
assure that each material conforms to its 
specification? 
13. 
14, 
Are a l l  tolerances specified and are they canrpatible 
with the materials and required manufacturing methods? 
If mechanical, metallurgical, and/or chemical test ing 
is required, are the necessary samples, coupons, or 
test bars defined, and test methods established? 
4925 : 66: 107 J-9 
Page 8 of 12 
See Dwgs 
See. Dwgs 
PSD DESIGN REXtEW CHECK LIST 
SUBJECT NAME: 
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DESIGN ENGINEER: mm 
Item No. Manufacturing Processes 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5- 
6 .  
7. 
8. 
9 .  
10. 
11. 
12. 
13 
14. 
Are the specified fabricat ion methods suited t o  the 
design and materials ? 
A r e  the process c a p b i l i t i e s  consistent with component 
requirements ? 
Is heat t reat ing,  s t r e s s  r e l i e f ,  n i t r i t i ng ,  flame 
hardening, or other special  process required? 
W i l l  processing and assembly a f f ec t  the dimensions? 
Are process specifications and tolerances designated? 
Are requirements after processing and assembly 
specified ? 
Have joining methods (welding, brazing, soldering , 
fastening) been selected t o  minimize e f f ec t  on 
tolerances and part var ia t ions? 
Are special  inspection and test processes such as 
radiograph, helium leak test, and penetrant dye check 
required ? 
If so, are  acceptance c r i t e r i a  specified? 
Has the most sui table  cleaning method been specified? 
Is a protective coating required? 
If  so, w i l l  protective coating a f fec t  mating parts? 
Are special  assembly requirements such as slignment, 
torque, lock wiring, s t a t i c  balancing, or  dynamic 
balanchg defined and documented? 
Is there an assembly instruct ion or specification? 
492 5 :66 : lw J- 10 
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See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
4923: 68 : 8186 
See Dwgs 
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. DESIGN ENGINEEXI: RATE 
~ ~~~ 
Item No. Manufacturing Processes 
15 
16 
17 * 
18 
19 
20. 
21. 
&e the clean room environmental characterist ics 
defined (such as maxipnun par t ic le  size, count, 
temperature, f l o w  ra te ,  e t c ,  )? 
Are there special  packaging, handling, or storage 
requirement s ? 
Are the  e w c i a l  process operator and e q u i p n t  
qualS9ication requirements specified? 
Are the surface finish,  waviness, and lay adequately 
defined? 
Are workmanship acceptance standards defined? 
Are the applicable worlunanship specifications 
referenced? 
Is a 'Build-up and Assembly Log required? 
4925: 66 : 107 J- 11 
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417-2 
DESIGN WGEmEw: DATE 
Item Ro. Environment 
I. 
2. 
3. 
,4. 
5. 
6 .  
Heve the environmental exposures, levels, and durations 
been fhlly determined? 
Have the environmen'tal effecC.6 on carprgonent performance 
longevity, and reliability been evaluated? 
Does operaeion of the component generate environments 
which'are &trimental to the component or to other 
assemblies or subsystems? 
Can the component withstand external and self- 
generated environments without employment of isolation 
devices? 
Is adequate protection from environments specified in 
detail where required? 
Were the relationships between environments and modes 
of failure considered in the failure mode and effects 
analysis 1 
NOTE: The fo l lowiq  envtronments should be considered: 
heat, cold, t hemna l  shock, high pressure, vacuum, 
pressure shock, humidity; vibration, acoustic 
noise, acceleration, shock, RFI-radiated, RFI- 
conducted, RFI-susceptibility; explosive atmosphere, 
solar radiation, nuclear radiation, salt atmosphere, 
fungus, meteoroids, zero-gravity, sand, dust, win&, 
J- 12 
tEFE3ENCE DOCUMENTS 
PCS-G Spec AGC- 
105 EO 
Similar to SCM 
RFI 
See Dwgs 
See Dwgs 
See FM & E Anal. 
SUBJECT NAME: 
1. 
2? . .  
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
8. 
Item No. Instrument at ion 
Have accurac$.and prectsion requirements been 
specified for performance parambtsrs? 
Heve provisions been made for instrumentation to meet 
these requirements? 
.. 
Have sensor installation requirements, including 
hermetic seaXhg and removal or replacement, been 
considerear 
Will.the Timertion of sensors affect the operation 
of the component? 
Is adequate instrumentation available for anticipated 
operating conditions? 
Is an instrumentation development program necessary? 
Are written calibration instructions available for 
the calibration of data gathering equipment? 
Has an adequate and reliable instrumentation wiring 
system been defined? 
4925: 66:107 J-13 
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EFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
AGC-STD-1245 
None required 
May install 
thermocouples 
ECTF 
AGC & M i l  Spec 
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